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The Politics of Being an Egg “Donor” and Shifting Notions of Reproductive Freedom 
 
Elizabeth A. Dedrick 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 As an Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) that has been available for over 
twenty years, the transfer of healthy eggs from a presumably fertile woman into the 
womb of a woman diagnosed as infertile has become a common part of the landscape of 
human reproduction in the United States.  Yet the general societal acceptance of this 
practice commonly known as “egg donation” oversimplifies the complex medical, 
ethical, and societal issues ignited by its use.  In light of the limited critical discussions 
presently occurring about egg transfer, I will interrogate some of the silences and more 
ambiguous issues invoked by its practice.  By giving particular attention to the often 
ignored experiences of egg “donors,” I will analyze the popularly used discourses around 
this ART.  In doing so, I will investigate the ways in which egg donation complicates 
notions of altruism, autonomy, and exploitation as well as what consequences this has for 
women’s reproductive freedoms as envisioned by many U.S. feminists. 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Prologue 
 
 I have been keeping a secret for the past year.  I realize that such a confession is 
not a typical beginning for a thesis.  Yet as a feminist researcher and scholar, I am 
conscious of the significance of my own experiences and beliefs to the directions and 
content of my scholarship, and thus feel that now is the time to bring this secret to light.  
To divulge this secret outright, I have discovered that I can pay my way through graduate 
school by participating in a highly profitable marketing scheme in which my body serves 
as the merchandise.  While this prospect may seem offensive to many in U.S. society – 
perhaps even those who are fiercely capitalistic – disclosing this fact as a feminist is 
certain to raise even more critical eyebrows among my colleagues and peers, because of 
the central role the body has played in feminist struggles throughout history.   
And isn’t this prospect of profiting from the use of women’s bodies directly 
illustrative of the many dilemmas with which feminists, and women in general are 
typically confronted?  The female body – as the target of violence and rape, the 
sexualized object of male fantasy and fetishization, an incubator for breeding slave or 
labor forces, or the object of numerous other abuses throughout the past and present – 
has, and continues to be simultaneously a main source, and site of women’s oppression.  
With such a legacy of manipulation, abuse, and degradation of female bodies, I could not 
help but feel that my willing participation in practices which involved my procurement of 
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financial gain through the use of my body would be seen as unacceptable and purely un-
feminist by many of my peers.   
 Some points of clarification are certainly necessary here, as our society has 
concocted numerous ways in which women can profit from the use of our bodies – not all 
of which are objected to by all feminists.  These lucrative uses of women’s bodies may be 
based on aspects ranging from our appearance, to our sexuality, to our reproductive 
capabilities.1  The last category is the one on which I will focus because the marketing 
scheme with which I involved myself is an Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) 
typically referred to as egg “donation” 2 – or as I will refer to it, egg transfer.  The 
practices of egg transfer raise many technological, ethical, and moral issues for any 
society in which they are used. 
 Through my exploration of this topic of egg transfer, I will focus specifically on 
the issues of altruism, exploitation, “choice” (as understood within feminist frameworks 
of reproduction), and their significance within the contexts of ART for contemporary 
women’s reproductive freedom.  Obviously, numerous other concerns and questions arise 
in relation to these issues, including: what does it mean to have “a child of one’s own” 
and why has our society placed so much value on families that are based on biological 
and/or genetic relationships?  What consequences could egg transfer have on a donor’s 
health in the distant future – particularly in light of the fact that this has not been studied 
yet?  Who should have access to egg transfer and should it be covered by health 
insurance?  How might egg transfer be forwarding a eugenic agenda?  What role are 
racist, classist, and heterocentric stereotypes playing in structuring access to egg transfer 
and other ARTs?  How does a lesbian’s use of her partner’s egg subvert legislation in 
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many U.S. states that make it difficult or impossible for same-sex parents to have joint 
custody of their children?  And most fundamentally, are researchers, practitioners, and 
user of ARTs conscionably justified in spending billions of dollars on improving and 
employing such “high tech” methods of reproduction when countless women all over the 
world cannot gain access to even “low tech” resources such as condoms and 
contraceptives, or adequate pre-natal care? 
This broad range of inquiries offers merely a sampling of questions that are 
sparked by egg transfer, and other ARTs.  Therefore a thorough study of this topic would 
require the exploration of a wide range of topics spanning from our changing notions and 
definitions of family, kinship, and motherhood, to the ways in which egg transfer and 
ARTs in general perpetuate the conflation of womanhood with motherhood.  My hope is 
that my examination of altruism, exploitation, and “choice” as they relate to egg transfer 
may offer new perspectives on these broader related issues.   
 Considering the issues of egg transfer in relation to both the donor and recipient 
expands this field of inquiry exponentially.  However, a preliminary glance at the pool of 
information available on egg transfer shows that the experiences and concerns of infertile 
women who utilize donated eggs have already been the focus of extensive research, 
political debate, and social policy, while the experiences of egg donors have been largely 
ignored.  Thus, I believe the situation of egg donors deserves much greater attention. 3   
My opinion on the need to consider donors’ experiences is significantly based on 
my own association with this ART, as well as my observations of contemporary 
representations of egg donors.  To explain further my own involvement with the practices 
of egg transfer, there was a time during which I found several aspects of the egg transfer 
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process (i.e. the financial compensation, the prospect of helping women suffering from 
infertility, and the opportunity to pass on some genes that I have experienced as being 
rather good) to be quite appealing.  At that time, these attractive components of being an 
egg donor prompted me to consider it seriously enough to undergo some of the initial 
screening phases for becoming an egg donor at two local infertility clinics.   
Ultimately, I chose not to offer my eggs to these or any donor programs, mainly 
because I could not reconcile several of the tensions that will be addressed in the 
following chapters.  While I have never been an egg donor, my interactions with the staff 
of donor programs, as well as serious contemplation of how my participation in this 
process might impact my life, is what largely sparked my intrigue in this research topic.  
Thus, questions about the egg transfer process within my own experiences are 
significantly responsible for my research into the implications of this ART for women 
donating their eggs and our society as a whole. 4 
 Without question, the issue of egg transfer is monumentally significant to both 
donors and recipients, as it inevitably has serious and long- lasting effects on both 
women’s bodies, psyches, and emotional selves.  My objective in focusing on the 
experiences of egg donors is not meant to disparage or demonize the women using those 
eggs – they obviously are driven by a wide range of social and personal motivations 
which largely reflect the painful personal and social burdens that accompany infertility 
(see Becker, 2000).   
 Yet as Haraway (1997) argues, continuing to examine situations such as egg 
transfer from the privileged perspectives of egg recipients constructs a very exclusionary 
portrayal of these scenarios.  In speaking about reproductive freedom more widely, 
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Haraway states, “Working uncritically from the viewpoint of the ‘standard’ group is the 
best way to come up with a particularly parochial and limited analysis of technoscientific 
knowledge or policy, which then masquerades as a general account that stands a good 
chance of reinforcing unequal privilege” (p.197).  In the interests of contesting such 
situations of unequal privilege and broadening the current discussion on women’s 
reproductive freedom, I will examine the implications of altruism, exploitation, and 
“choice” by bringing forth the typically marginalized interests and concerns of egg 
donors.   
 
                                                 
1 I see it as no coincidence that each of the realms in which women’s bodies are typically marketed fit 
within one of the two gendered scenarios that have defined women’s existence throughout much of 
Western history, i.e. the (virgin) Mother or the whore. 
2 The large majority of medical, infertility, and popular literature unproblematically refer to the practices I 
am discussing as egg “donation.”  I however, find this terminology to be a misnomer in many of the 
instances of its use because monetary exchange or other means of compensation are awarded to the egg 
“donor” (i.e. the woman who produces the eggs).  While I would ideally prefer to refer to the process as 
“egg transfer” throughout this paper as Shanley (2001) does, I think such efforts would seriously hinder the 
clarity of my discussion by frequently resulting in excessive wordiness.  Where possible, I will substitute 
the terminology of “egg transfer,” but I ask that my readers remain conscious of my objections to the terms 
of egg “donors” and the process of egg “donation,” even as I utilize them in my vocabulary. 
3 Any discussion of the experiences of egg donors obviously invokes consideration of the male process of 
gamete donation known as sperm donation.  Because egg and sperm donation both involve the contribution 
of one’s gametes to a child that the donor does not intend to parent, many people are tempted to compare 
these practices.  Although contrasting the perceptions of these two practices can be useful in examining 
their gendered contexts, I find that the differing levels of participation and consequences for each type of 
donor, as well as the different expectations of each type of donor (based on gender norms), make it 
problematic to assume that egg and sperm donation can simply be paralleled.  See Haimes (1993) for an 
expanded version of this argument. 
4 I offer my apologies to any of my readers who feel deceived by the initial disclosure of “my secret.”  The 
intentional vagueness I applied in terms of having “discovered that I can pay my way through graduate 
school” with egg donation is not meant to be misleading purely for the sake of trickery.  The following 
discussion is intended to challenge and disrupt many of the presumptions about women, bodies, and 
reproduction that are harbored by much of American society.  Thus, I felt that it would be important for my 
readers to consider what assumptions about egg donation they are carrying into their reading of this paper. 
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Introduction 
 
In order to examine the many medical and societal intricacies involved in egg 
transfer in any depth, I think establishing some background information on the processes 
of egg transfer, and their contexts within ARTs more generally, is necessary.  Thus, I will 
begin with a brief explanation of how egg donors are matched with recipients and the 
medical procedures involved. 1   
The Practices of Egg Transfer 
 Egg transfer is the retrieval of anywhere from fifteen to twenty2 presumably 
healthy eggs 3 from one woman to be fertilized and implanted into another woman, with 
the hopes and intentions of resolving infertility4 (Shanley, 2001; Borrero, 2001).  The 
development of egg transfer, first successfully conducted in 1983,5 was enabled by the 
innovation of in vitro fertilization (IVF) technologies five years earlier in 1978.  
Following the emergence of IVF, a whole string of new biotechnologies, including egg 
transfer, rapidly emerged to transform the practices of human reproduction by offering 
people opportunities they had never had before to treat their infertility (Lindheim, 1998; 
Davis, 2003).   
 Egg transfer begins with a diagnosis of infertility because without such 
conditions, the need for procuring healthy eggs would be obviated.  Once an infertile 
person or couple decides to use egg transfer, they must be coordinated with a woman who 
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is willing to provide her eggs, which typically is arranged in one of two ways.  In some 
instances, this process may take place within a family or among friends, in which case it 
is referred to as “known donor.”   
The alternative arrangement is known as “anonymous donation” in which 
infertility clinics or egg donor programs recruit women – often through advertisements in 
community or college newspapers, billboards, or word of mouth – to provide their eggs 
(Borrero, 2001; Gorrill, 1998).  In these instances, donors frequently receive financial 
compensation for their “time and inconvenience,” usually ranging in amount from $1,500 
to $5,0006 (Macklin, 1996; Merrick & Blank, 2003).  Some instances have been 
documented in which people independently seeking donor eggs (i.e. not through a clinic 
or egg donor program) have placed advertisements for donors whom they wish to possess 
very select and elite characteristics.7  Such solicitation ads have been quoted to involve 
compensatory donor fees running as high as $100,000 (Gurmankin, 2001).   
Anonymous donation may also occur in situations of egg sharing in which women 
undergoing infertility treatment agree to give half of their retrieved eggs to another 
infertile woman in exchange for a reduction in the costs of their own infertility treatment.  
As Gorrill (1998) indicates, the frequency of egg sharing has greatly reduced since recent 
technologies enabled cryopreservation of fertilized embryos to be used at a later time. 
 Whether egg transfer involves known or anonymous donation, both the infertile 
individual or couple, and the egg donor must submit to extensive medical and 
psychological screening to determine their physical and emotional fitness for undergoing 
this process (Gorrill, 1998).  In cases of anonymous donation, the medical and 
psychological history and status of potential donors is included in a profile compiled by 
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donor programs that also generally includes physical descriptions of the women, 
information on their sexual and reproductive history, details of their family relationships, 
and descriptions of their interests.  These profiles are then scrutinized by potential egg 
recipients as they search for the donor who best meets their criteria (Blacksher, 2000).   
 When a willing donor has been matched with a recipient, the medical aspects of 
the egg transfer process may begin.  The transfer of eggs from the donor to recipient is 
initiated by the suppression of the ovaries of both parties by daily self- injection of 
gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH).  These injections, which typically produce 
menopause- like symptoms such as hot flashes and insomnia, are used to synchronize the 
menstrual cycles of the donor and recip ient so that the maturation and readiness for 
fertilization of the donor’s eggs will match the recipient’s period of endometrial 
receptivity8 (Shanley, 2001; Buster, 1998).   
 Following about three weeks of GnRH injection, the donor switches to injections 
of follicle stimulating hormones (FSH) to hyperstimulate her ovaries, causing them to 
mature an unusually large number of eggs.  While the donor injects FSH, the recipient 
takes an “exogenous hormonal regiment” that simulates “the pattern of hormone 
secretion occurring in the natural menstrual cycle” (Borrero, 2001, p. 170) to prepare her 
uterine wall for implantation of the fertilized egg.  After the donor’s egg-containing 
follicles have had time to mature, she takes human chorionic gonadotropic (hCG) to 
prompt ovulation.   
 Between thirty-four and thirty-six hours after this final injection, the donor is 
sedated intravenously with a local anesthetic and a doctor retrieves the eggs by 
transvaginal oocyte aspiration.  This procedure involves the doctor locating the egg 
 9 
follicles via ultrasound, inserting a needle through the vaginal wall, and capturing the 
eggs by sucking them into the needle.  If the eggs are to be fertilized in vitro (as opposed 
to in the recipient’s body), they are placed in a culture dish with the sperm.   
 After about twenty-four hours, the eggs and sperm that have fertilized are placed 
in an incubator for an additional day, after which, the strongest three or four embryos are 
introduced into the uterus of the recipient via a small catheter.  In most instances, the 
recipient must continue taking additional hormonal injections for a short period following 
the transfer in order to facilitate the implantation of the embryo in the endometrial wall 
(Shanley, 2001; Borrero, 2001; Buster, 1998).   
 During the twenty years of it s use, the processes of egg transfer have increased in 
sophistication and effectiveness to the point that procedures using fresh (i.e. not 
cryopreserved) donor eggs have the highest rates of all ARTs in terms of both pregnancy 
and live births, at 51% and 44 %, respectively (Wright, Schieve, Reynolds, & Jeng, 
2003).  Yet despite these notable success rates, most infertile people typically decide to 
utilize “donated” eggs only after several years of failed attempts with other ART 
treatments (Becker, 2000)9.   
Even in light of the apparent hesitancy of people to resort to egg transfer, the 
National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP) 
offers specific figures indicating that the egg transfer process affects the lives of many 
Americans.  According to the NCCDPHP (2003) report, “donor eggs or embryos were 
used in slightly more than 10% of all ART cycles carried out [in the U.S.] in 2000, or 
10,389 cycles.”  Based on recent trends, figures indicating even higher uses of donor eggs 
over the past four years have been anticipated. 
 10 
Contextualizing Current Perceptions of Egg Transfer  
 With upwards of 10,000 cycles of egg transfer occurring each year, there surely 
must be thousands of women, if not more, who have provided their eggs to other women 
dealing with infertility.  In returning to the confession I made at the beginning of this 
thesis, such contexts may lead my readers to wonder why I felt so compelled to keep my 
consideration of becoming an egg donor a secret.   
 Granted, a willingness to donate, and the act of aiding others in their quest for 
parenthood is certainly a noble undertaking.  The goodness of egg donors inherent within 
this willingness to aide people they may not even know, has been widely emphasized 
through heightened attention to the apparent altruistic nature of women’s participation as 
donors.  Additionally, women’s ability to control their own bodies and make free choices 
about the use of their bodies (as some feminists argue egg donation is) can be viewed 
positively as a form of women’s empowerment.  Furthermore, in an era when the first 
American generation to include individuals whose conception occurred in a Petri dish – 
rather than their biological mother’s body – are now adults, our society certainly is 
familiar with the transformation of practices and perceptions of reproduction prompted 
by ARTs.  Yet many of the dynamics involved in the egg transfer process – particularly 
those that may pertain to feminist conceptions of reproductive freedom – make the 
admirability of egg donation much more ambiguous.   
 Unequivocally asserting a well-defined set of feminist beliefs about reproductive 
freedom or reproductive rights is impossible.  Just as feminist theories and beliefs vary by 
groups and individuals and across time, so too do visions of what counts as, and is 
encompassed by the concept of reproductive freedom.  Despite the variety of feminist 
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standpoints, I think it is safe to contend that reproductive freedom in general, is grounded 
in feminists’ belief that women should be able to choose to have or not have children in 
contexts that are free from coercion and exploitation.   
 In reflecting back upon my own experiences, I think I felt the ambiguity of egg 
donation’s admirability very intensely due to my commitment to feminist ideologies.  I 
believe that my desire to keep the use of my eggs for financial gain hidden from my 
feminist cohort is due to my fear that it would be perceived as a disregard, or even assault 
on some of the beliefs that have been most fiercely defended by feminists throughout 
U.S. history.  Namely, as a woman, the act of profiting financially from the use of one’s 
body could be viewed as counteracting centuries of feminist efforts aimed at enabling 
women to control their own bodies and freeing them from situations of bodily 
exploitation in all of its forms (Tong, 1996; Petchesky, 1995).  Such a position presents 
an obvious contradiction to my earlier comments – that egg donations is seen by some 
feminists as a form of women’s empowerment.  This contradiction begins to illustrate the 
wide variety of feminist perspectives on reproductive freedom. 
 Within current contexts of egg transfer in the U.S., the component of financial 
compensation for donors and the risks they undertake present the greatest points of 
debate in terms of applying feminist notions of reproductive freedom to this ART.  In 
defense of the practices involved in egg transfer, the argument can be, and frequently is 
made that women are not being exploited through the use of their bodies (or parts of their 
bodies) in this way (Dickens, 2001, Dill, 2001).  At no point are women forced or 
coerced into participation, as there are numerous other ways in which graduate students 
(such as myself, for example) or other financially strapped women can procure needed 
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funds including employment, loans, grants, etc.  In fact, could women’s decision to 
donate their eggs actually reflect the gains won by feminism, in that women make the 
choice on their own to use their bodies in whatever manner they wish?  As some 
feminists contend, might this be just one more way in which feminist battles for 
reproductive freedom have empowered women?  
 Such questions concerning the status of women’s reproductive freedom within the 
contexts of egg transfer prompt the interrogation of issues such as women’s bodily 
autonomy and the potential for exploitation of donors.  As a result, debates over the 
utilization of egg transfer – held both within and outside of feminist contexts are shifting 
our societal views of contemporary women’s reproductive freedom.   
In considering the weight of women’s motives to become donors as well as the 
personal and social consequences of their participation, the arguments made both for and 
against the practices of egg donation present several confounding points of tension to 
feminists’ theoretical and practical efforts to protect and empower women.  Thus, I 
contend that the time is ripe for a close examination of this topic and the complex 
dynamics it entails in order to confront the implications it has for the ways we think about 
women and their bodies, as well as the reproduction of our species and society.   
 In the following chapters, I will specifically attend to the impacts of egg transfer 
on feminist frameworks about reproductive freedom.  In order to accomplish this, I will 
examine how the discourses around egg transfer and the representations they produce 
complicate notions of altruism, autonomy, exploitation, and “choice.”  Chapter 1, “Lost 
in the Transfer: Disappearing risks through the idealization of altruism” will provide a 
framework for this discussion by identifying the ways in which representations of egg 
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transfer construct narratives that highlight the altruistic motives of donors and minimize 
the risks and consequences they face.  More specifically, the emphasis on altruism is 
magnified and the attention to risks disappears in the translation of professional egg 
transfer literature for lay members of society.  In considering the gaps between these 
representations, I will explore the contributions of ART practitioners to cultural 
perspectives of egg transfer and their impact on the experiences of donors. 
 Chapter 2, “Analyzing the ‘Choice’ and Gendered Assumptions behind Donation” 
will conduct a more in-depth analysis of the consequences that emerge from the hyper-
emphasis placed on altruism as a donor motive in representations of egg donation.  
Specifically, I will examine the ways in which the notion of bodily autonomy is 
foundational in making the representations of donor altruism plausible.  The connection 
between the premises of altruism and autonomy will be woven to include their influence 
in reifying normative gender expectations through hidden discourses of self-sacrifice and 
maternal giving.  Furthermore, the issues of informed consent and the appropriation of 
pro-choice rhetoric perpetuated by assumptions of altruism will be challenged. 
 Chapter 3, “Deciphering Donor Fees: The dynamics of commodifying and 
exploiting egg donors” will build off of the first two chapters which function to pull 
financial incentive as a donor motive out from under the conveniently prominent guise of 
altruism as the only factor motivating donors.  By considering egg transfer as a means of 
commodifying bodies, or parts of bodies, I will discuss the degree to which this results in 
situations of donor exploitation, as well as how this may be shaping contemporary 
perspectives of women.  
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 To integrate the discussions of altruism and autonomy with that of the potential 
for exploitation, chapter 4, “Re-conceiving Reproductive Freedom,” will attempt to 
assess the ways in which these three concepts operate simultaneously within the 
representations of egg donation.  In doing so, I will explain how current representations 
of egg transfer reflect discourses that equate women’s reproductive freedom with 
stewardship.  Because such notions are a shift from earlier perspectives of reproductive 
freedom, this concluding chapter will use the concepts of altruism and donors’ freedom 
from exploitation explored in prior chapters to consider the ways in which the 
development and increasing use of ARTs such as egg transfer are impacting common 
perceptions of women’s bodies and rights.   
   
 
 
                                                 
1 While the medical procedures involved in egg transfer are the same for most cases within the U.S. and in 
other parts of the world, the social and political dynamics around this ART certainly vary within different 
societies.  Unless otherwise indicated, my discussion is regarding egg transfer only in the U.S. 
2 The number of retrieved eggs can of course be lower, but some reports indicate that upwards of 45 eggs 
have been obtained from single retrieval cycles (Kalfoglou & Geller, 2000). 
3 Medical and scientific literature also refers to eggs as oocytes and ova. 
4 Generally, infertility refers to an inability to conceive after one year of unprotected heterosexual 
intercourse (Becker, 2000).  In cases involving egg transfer, the causes of infertility include early onset and 
physiologic menopause, surgical sterilization, as well as ovarian failure due to such experiences as 
radiation, chemotherapy, or increasing age (Lindheim, 1998).  Cases eligible for egg transfer may also 
result from “women carrying transmittable genetic abnormalities which could affect their offspring” 
(Davis, 2003).  I also recognize that other uses of egg transfer are emerging as its use is becoming more 
commonplace.  For instance, a fertile woman may be implanted with a fertilized embryo (not using her own 
egg) for the purposes of surrogacy, or joint “biological” motherhood within a lesbian couple.  While these 
scenarios certainly raise many important issues, my discussion of egg transfer will exclude situations 
involving surrogacy and shared biological motherhood because I can not do justice to the significance of 
these issues within the contexts of this paper.  
5 Although the first successful human egg transfer procedures occurred in 1983, the first births from the 
initial uses were not reported until early 1984 (Buster, 1998). 
6 The provision of financial compensation to egg donors is the practice that, by and large, differentiates 
uses of egg transfer in the U.S. from all other countries that utilize this practice (Sauer, 2001; Mead, 1999).   
7 The elite characteris tics that tend to be sought after by such advertisements include high intelligence 
(usually as measured by SAT scores), fair skin, tall, light colored hair and eyes, as well as athletic and 
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musical talents (Mead, 1999; Wilding, 1999).  The potential impact of such selection criteria has been 
criticized for contributing to a “new eugenics” kind of thinking that risks the promotion of some societal 
characteristics at the cost of eliminating others which are viewed as less desirable (Becker, 2000; subRosa, 
2002)  
8 If the recipient has already undergone menopause or does not have ovarian function for another reason, 
the hormonal injections are unnecessary for her.  Also, if the recipient intends to freeze the fertilized egg 
for later use, the injection of hormo nes to synchronize her cycle with the donor’s cycles is again 
unnecessary. 
9 Becker (2000) indicates that the resistance to immediately utilizing the more successful practices of egg 
transfer is due in large part to people’s desire to have “a child of one’s own” (i.e. one conceived from the 
gametes of the people who wish to be parents).  These same feelings are used to explain why many people 
ultimately choose to use egg transfer rather than adopt a child that will be biologically unrelated to the 
parents that intend to raise the child. 
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Chapter 1 
Lost in the Transfer: Disappearing risks through the idealization of altruism 
 
 
Donors are as much our patients as the recipients we so eagerly serve.  They 
too need our best efforts and professional talents to safely guide them through 
a complicated and potentially dangerous therapy (Sauer, 2001). 
 
 The above quotation by Mark Sauer, a renowned Reproductive Endocrinologist 
and leading scholar in the field of egg transfer, seems to be the mantra of ART 
practitioners in their professional literature on the topic of egg donation.  In devoted 
adherence to the principles of the Hippocratic Oath, practitioners of egg transfer have 
committed themselves to ensuring the ethical soundness and medical safety of donors’ 
treatment.  Or so they apparently like to tell one another.  While professional ART 
literature may encourage such conduct, the representations of egg transfer produced by 
ART practitioners for mass consumption can be read in a somewhat different way.   
 A significant disparity between how practitioners professionally and popularly 
portray egg donation is apparent through an examination of the ways in which the details 
of egg transfer are (or are not) presented to potential egg donors, recipients, and general 
members of the public.  Specifically, the risks associated with egg transfer for donor 
women and representations of their perceived motives are emphasized differently 
between information created by ART professionals for their colleagues as opposed to that 
geared toward lay people.   
 To attend to these inconsistent representations of egg transfer, this chapter will 
provide an analysis of both professional ART literature, and the websites created to 
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support infertile people and recruit donors.  In doing so, I will highlight some of the 
discourses and ideologies that are prevalent within each type of text.  By dissecting these 
differing representations and the related discourses of egg transfer I will establish the 
groundwork for my later analysis of the significance that concepts of altruism and 
exploitation have for egg transfer and women’s reproductive decisions in general.  
Furthermore, I will show how the treatment of these topics in texts about egg transfer 
eclipse concerns around the risks and consequences for women’s bodies and health. 
 During the twenty-year period of the existence of egg transfer, ART practitioners 
have compiled an abundant quantity of internet resources as well as a wealth of literature 
on the topic.  Fully addressing such a great magnitude of sources in a single chapter is 
obviously impossible.  Therefore, my objective is not to provide a complete overview of 
this copious collection of sources.  Instead, I wish to bring forth several key examples 
that will demonstrate the attitudes and beliefs that generally support the uses of egg 
transfer.   
 The representations of different aspects of egg donation by ART practitioners 
requires examination because – through their words and cyber representations – these 
individuals play a highly significant role in shaping both our cultural ideas about these 
practices as well as women’s likelihood as potential donors to participate.  But an equally 
important reason for interrogating the work of ART practitioners is because they are the 
people who determine and administer the treatment and care given to egg donors during 
the actual procedures of egg transfer.  Thus, the attitudes of ART practitioners that are 
expressed in their literature will largely determine the quality of egg donors’ experiences.   
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The vast majority of individuals producing information on egg donation – 
whether it is designed for public and professional consumption, or the designation of 
restrictions on practitioners’ behaviors and practices – clearly are interested in increasing 
the accessibility and breadth of knowledge about this practice to other professionals and 
people who may utilize ARTs.  Yet the professional esteem and personal financial profit 
that authors of these materials are set to gain through promotion of this practice cannot be 
denied.  As such, ART practitioners undoubtedly have a vested interest in maximizing 
positive perceptions of egg transfer.  My analysis will proceed with awareness of this 
bias. 
Analysis of Professional ART Literature on Egg Transfer 
 Although the self- interest of ART practitioners undoubtedly plays a role in the 
representations of egg transfer that they provide to others, the quotation that opens this 
chapter expresses a sentiment that seems to permeate much of the professional literature 
on this topic.1  Throughout the majority of these texts, ART practitioners seemingly 
express concern for protecting both recipients and donors from physical and 
psychological harm.  The most apparent evidence of practitioners’ concern for donors is 
exhibited by the establishment and regular update of guidelines for the practices of egg 
transfer by The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).   
In the absence of any national legislation or regulation of the practices of egg 
transfer ASRM, an organization composed of medical practitioners, has laid out a set of 
guidelines for ensuring the safe and ethical practice of egg transfer (see American Society 
of Reproductive Medicine, 2002).  Many of the guidelines that ASRM establish relate to 
indications for using egg transfer, medical and psychological screening of recipients, and 
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the screening and selection of potential donors.  Clauses of the ASRM guidelines that are 
geared specifically toward protecting donors, and thus those that are most relevant to the 
present discussion include the necessity of informed consent and regulation of monetary 
compensation.   
 Demanding and defining informed consent 
 According to the ASRM guidelines, informed consent is a necessary component 
of the egg transfer process.  Specifically, they state, “All individua ls involved in ovum 
donation should be explicitly advised of the risks and adverse effects of ovarian 
stimulation and retrieval, and this process should be documented by informed consent” 
(American Society of Reproductive Medicine, 2003).  Related to the issue of informed 
consent, the ASRM also contends that donors should be assured of confidentiality 
according to local statutes, should contractually establish their rights, limits, and duties 
toward any resulting children, and should be advised to seek lega l council if their 
concerns are not addressed.   
The professional ART literature produced by practitioners provides elaboration on 
the ASRM descriptions of informed consent, by identifying what information must be 
communicated to, and clearly understood by the donor women in order to adhere to 
ethical standards for egg transfer.  According to Gorrill (1998), the information presented 
to donors during the screening process should include:  
types of infertility problems treated with egg donation and chances for success, 
rationale and steps involved with ovulation induction/monitoring, side effects of 
medications and anticipated discomfort, details and risks of egg retrieval, type of 
anesthesia used, and risks of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS).  
Emphasis on use of effective contraception beginning in the cycle in which the 
GnRH agonist is started is important.  The unknown long-term effects of egg 
donation and the unknown risk of ovarian cancer associated with the use of 
ovulation induction agents is discussed (p.46).2   
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Other topics that Gorrill (1998) indicates are discussed with donors are the distribution 
and/or storage of retrieved eggs, monetary compensation including partial compensation 
for incomplete cycles, the handling of donor medical complications, and how the 
anonymity of donors is maintained.  In addition to demanding the full disclosure of all 
potential risks and effects to donors, most professional literature also indicates that this 
information must be explained in ways that are fully comprehensible to the donors, which 
may require taking the donor’s level of education into consideration (Gorrill, 1998).   
 Obviously, there is a lot of information that needs to be clearly and thoroughly 
communicated to potential donors to ensure that they have a complete opportunity to 
consider the complex implications of their decision to donate.  Within their professional 
literature, the willingness of ART practitioners to openly discuss the risks donors face as 
well as the ethical challenges introduced by egg donation illustrate an apparent 
commitment to ensuring that donors’ choice to participate in egg transfer is made with an 
awareness of all the relevant conditions and procedures.   
 Monitoring monetary compensation 
 The second issue particularly pertaining to egg donors within the ASRM 
guidelines regards the use of monetary compensation for donors’ participation in the egg 
transfer process.  In relation to this issue, ASRM asserts the following procedures: 
 
A. Compensation to the donor should be in compliance with the ASRM 
Ethics Committee Report [Fertil Steril 2000; 74:216-20].3 
B. Monetary compensation of the donor should reflect the time, 
inconvenience, and physical and emotional demands and risks associated 
with oocyte donation and should be at a level that minimizes the 
possibility of undue inducement of donors and the suggestion that 
payment is for the oocytes themselves. 
C. Financial obligations and responsibilities in the event of complications or 
medical expenses of a donor should be contractually agreed upon prior to 
initiation of a stimulation cycle. 
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D. Payment may be prorated based on the number of steps completed in the 
procedure. 
E. Payment should not be predicated on clinical outcome. 
       (2002, p.S8) 
 
Specifically in light of the ASRM’s provisions for informed consent, these suggested 
regulations for monetary compensation indicate that ASRM members wish to eliminate, 
or at the very least minimize the potential for financially exploiting donors and 
commodifying their eggs.   
Yet the absence of specificity on any of these guidelines leaves much room for 
interpretation in actual practice.  For instance, at what rate should donors in incomplete 
cycles be prorated?  How far into the cycle must they go before receiving any level of 
compensation?  Even if responsibility for the donor’s medical costs are predetermined in 
a contract, would it be acceptable for the stipulation to place the financial obligation on 
the donor?  At what level of monetary compensation does the financial incentive become 
“undue inducement”?  Could undue inducement be measured differently for donors who 
are in dissimilar life situations? 
 Many of the issues raised in the above questions are those that ART practitioners 
attempt to philosophically address in their professional literature, but their core concerns 
seem to most emphasize the issues of compensating donors appropriately and preventing 
undue pressure to donate from financial incentives.  McGee, Anchor, & Caplan (1998) 
summarize the issues discussed by most practitioners nicely in stating, “the donor of 
reproductive material must be compensated both at a level and in a manner consistent 
with the real risks involved in particular procedures, respect for the dignity of the donor, 
and in financial amounts that are reasonable for the expected use of the materials” 
(p.225).  These authors thus assert the commonly held practitioner assumption that egg 
 22 
donors’ willingness to undertake the “significant inconvenience as well as discomfort and 
risks” (American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2003, p.S6) that accompany 
participation as an egg donor necessitates some sort of appropriate financial reward.   
 At the same time, McGee, Anchor, & Caplan’s statement hints at the potential for 
the coercive impact of donor fees if they overcompensate for the attendant risks.  In 
reference to this latter concern, Gorrill (1998) indicates that potential donors who appear 
to be overly persuaded to donate by the prospect of financial gain are typically eliminated 
from consideration.  She writes, “All ovum donors, whether anonymous or known, are 
screened for voluntariness.  In the case of anonymous donation, financial coercion is a 
major concern.  The donor’s financial status and legal history, including filing of 
bankruptcy, are explored to ensure that donation is not done as an act of desperation” 
(p.45).  This apparent practitioner sensitivity to awarding donors an adequate but not 
exorbitant amount of compensation suggests that this aspect of donation requires a 
delicate balance. 
 On another interesting, and rather telling note, in almost all of the professional 
ART texts I examined, the discussion of monetary compensation, and by default donor’s 
financial motives, inevitably initiated from, or devolved into a discussion of donor’s 
altruistic motives.  For instance, Rosenthal (1998) claimed that, “while initially attracted 
by the financial remuneration, other motivations, including a feeling of altruism or 
identification with the infertile, became more primary” (p. 189, my emphasis).   
Similarly, Gorrill (1998) begins her discussion of “Screening for Motivation and 
Voluntariness” by saying, “Most women who want to become an oocyte donor express an 
altruistic desire to help another woman as an important part of their motivation” (p.45).  
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Clearly, these statements, organized by societal notions of gender, indicate practitioners’ 
desire to represent altruistic motivations as the prima facie reason for a woman to donate 
her eggs.  By positioning altruistic motives of donors in this way, practitioners are able to 
both preemptively deny the undue influence of donor fees and provide evidence that 
financial gain is not acting as the predominant influence in donors’ decisions.   
 Regulating egg transfer in theory and practice 
 Based on the concerns expressed by practitioners of egg transfer in their self-
determined ASRM guidelines, and through the dominant topics of their professional 
literature, it seems as though the underlying concerns for donors’ safety center on the 
risks they encounter and their motives for taking on these risks.  By focusing their 
discussions and debates around the practices of financial compensation and informed 
consent, ART practitioners can supposedly ensure that they are taking measures to 
safeguard donors’ informed decision-making abilities, so their choices to become donors 
are not coerced or manipulated by outside forces.  In other words, by attending to the 
risks and potential for donor exploitation, while simultaneously identifying mechanisms 
(e.g. monetary caps, psychological counseling) and regulations they have enacted to avert 
the negative consequences of egg transfer for donors, professional ART texts demonstrate 
practitioners’ commitment to maintaining the ethical and safe involvement of donors. 
 While the ASRM guidelines and practitioners’ debates of them attempt to make 
egg transfer as safe and ethical as possible for all involved, several critics of egg transfer 
and some practitioners themselves acknowledge that adherence to the ASRM guidelines 
for egg donation is not policed or monitored in any fashion.  Sauer (2001) concedes that 
the problems arising from the absence of practitioner accountability materialize because 
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practitioners’ self-regulation is assumed.  He states, “it remains unclear whether 
physicians heed such tenets (as those established by ASRM), because policing is 
nonexistent and sanctions have never been levied against violators” (p. 1).  Furthermore, 
some critics of egg transfer have expressed skepticism about ART practitioners’ ability to 
determine the acceptability of their own practices (Kalfoglou & Geller, 2000). 4  Many 
critiques of egg transfer identify an inevitable conflict of interest in this situation. 
 Although these shortcomings of the ASRM guidelines that I have identified are 
not plainly visible within professional texts on egg transfer, the absence of enforcement 
for the regulations, and conflicts of interest embedded within these guidelines becomes 
much more apparent when the professional texts are compared to the information 
provided to the general public (including egg donors and recipients).  In particular, 
practitioners’ concerns about informed consent and the potential impacts of financial 
compensation seem to get lost in the transfer from professional readership to its general 
public audience.  And as a side effect of this disappearance of practitioners’ reservations 
about egg transfer, the attention to the health risks and bodily consequences faced by 
donors is also diverted.  To more fully illustrate the disappearance of risks and attention 
to financial compensation, I will now turn to an examination of how representations of 
egg transfer prepared for lay people fail to exhibit the same standards that are expressed 
in the professional literature.   
Analysis of Egg Donor Program Websites 
 In order to consider the representations of egg donation provided to the general 
public by ART practitioners, I will analyze the websites of two egg donor programs: 
“Egg Donation, Inc.,” and “The Egg Donor Program and The Surrogacy Program.”  
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These particular sites were chosen because they incorporate several of the components 
that seem to be common to many infertility clinic and donor program websites.  The fact 
that the donor program websites are designed for a different audience than the 
professional literature does not negate the fact that the information they provide is 
basically produced by the same parties.  In some instances, the websites created to assist 
infertile people and potential donors are maintained by clinics run by the same 
practitioners who are contributing to professional literature.  Several sites, many of which 
are for donor programs in particular, may not be maintained specifically by medical ART 
practitioners, but they are fashioned by people who work very closely with practitioners, 
and thus are an integral part of their success.   
 The case of William “Bill” Handel offers just one example of how intricately 
involved ART practitioners are in the simultaneous production of professional literature 
and the representations of egg transfer provided for mass consumption.  As a co-author of 
one of the chapters in Mark Sauer’s edited textbook, Principles of Oocyte and Embryo 
Donation (1998), William Handel clearly holds a position of respect and authority as a 
practitioner in the field of egg transfer.  Although I was not aware of the connection 
before selecting the websites I will be analyzing, Bill Handel coincidentally is also the 
founding director of Egg Donation, Inc.5  In this latter position, Handel certainly has 
significant influence over the character and content of Egg Donation, Inc.’s website.   
 Surely Bill here is not the only instance of overlap between these sources of 
information.  Yet even if producers of professional literature and more popularized 
representations of egg donation are not produced by the self-same people, it still seems 
fair to assume that they share, and are working for the same interests.  Given this 
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connection, it seems somewhat peculiar that these two sources of representations of egg 
transfer tell somewhat different stories of the use of this ART.   
To support this assertion, I will offer some of my observations on the popularized 
representations of egg donation as illustrated on the donor program websites.  In 
particular, I will examine the ways in which donor motives and the risks they encounter – 
the two concerns that composed the underlying issues throughout most of the 
professional literature – are portrayed (or not).  In doing so, I will demonstrate how ART 
practitioners have failed to maintain their commitment to ethics and donor safety when 
their theories are translated into information for egg donors and recipients. 
 Minimizing risks to donors  
 The first website, http://www.eggdonation.com, is a production of The Egg Donor 
Program and The Surrogacy Program (EDP)6 based out of Los Angeles, California.  The 
second website at http://www.eggdonor.com is for Egg Donation, Inc. – another donor 
program based out of Encino, California.  Both of these websites mainly serve clients 
who reside near their clinics, but they are willing to accommodate recipients and donors 
from international locations as well as from other locations within the U.S.  Currently, 
Egg Donation, Inc. maintains clinics on both the east and west coasts of the United 
States.   
 To a great extent, the imagery found on these web pages – including headshots of 
gorgeous sample donors, cuddly cartoon babies, relics of idealistic childhood, and Judeo-
Christian imagery of the creation of Adam – comes off as blatant propaganda which 
maximizes the admirability, benefits, and desirability of egg transfer, while making its 
detrimental aspects almost entirely invisible.  This imagery is certainly not benign as it 
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serves as a visual accompaniment to the, at times, almost romanticized description of the 
processes of egg transfer.7   
 Neither EDP nor Egg Donation, Inc. really differs from professional literature in 
their apparent intent to ensure the safety and welfare of all people involved in the egg 
transfer processes.  EDP repeatedly emphasizes this commitment in stating that they 
work with clinics staffed only by doctors who “meet (the program’s) stringent 
requirements for care, safety, ethics and kindness.”  Yet this commitment to safety and 
ethics is left rather ambiguous because EDP never elaborates on the substance of these 
“stringent requirements”.  This lack of specificity by itself could be viewed as just a 
careless omission, but a general sense of vagueness or the absence of details about the 
practices of egg transfer throughout these websites seems to undermine practitioners’ 
alleged commitment to safety and ethics.   
 A more obvious and less excusable instance of this charge is evident in the failure 
of the EDP and Egg Donation, Inc. websites to openly and fully address the risks women 
undertake in becoming donors.  Although the dual objective of EDP’s website seems to 
be the recruitment of both egg donors and people seeking eggs, the website makes 
virtually no mention of the challenges or risks that a potential donor may face.  In fact, 
the only part of the website which bears any information about negative consequences of 
donation is in a section of the site designated for letters between donors and recipients.  
As one supposed donor wrote to her eggs’ recipients, “The things that I must endure in 
this process are a mere speck of sand in comparison to what the both of you have had to 
go through physically and mentally” 8 (Egg Donation Program and Surrogacy Program, 
2004).  As the only indication of any negative aspects of being a donor on the EDP 
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website, this minimization of the risks donors do take on by referring to them as merely 
“things” which must be tolerated, clearly offers a misleading image of the egg transfer 
processes. 
 In comparison to the extensive discussion on risks within professional ART 
literature and ASRM guidelines dictating the necessity of full disclosure, the omission of 
risk information on the EDP website seems particularly detrimental to potential donors 
who may visit the site.  Even if EDP intends to disclose the risks and other components 
necessary for informed consent later in the process, the failure to make any mention at all 
of even the existence of the risks involved could mislead some potent ial donors about 
what their involvement might entail (Gurmankin, 2001).   
 The Egg Donation, Inc. website provides a much more detailed description of the 
donor and recipient matching, screening, and medical processes than does EDP.  Even 
still, the Egg Donation, Inc. site does not really acknowledge the risks donors may face.  
In describing the medical procedures of transfer, this website acknowledges donors’ use 
of hormones, the occurrence of a clinical procedure to retrieve the eggs, and possibility of 
donors’ disappointment if the egg transfer does not result in a successful pregnancy.  
However, these aspects of egg transfer are presented in relatively neutral terms which 
seem to avoid acknowledging the potential for negative outcomes or effects.  For 
instance, omitting information on the side-effects that typically result from the use of 
fertility hormones, or saying that the egg retrieval is performed “under sedation” rather 
than under anesthesia, may make the processes seem much less consequential to donors 
than they actually are.   
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As further evidence of their disinclination to identify any negative outcomes of 
egg donation, in their “Medical Overview” section, Egg Donation, Inc. claims, “Perhaps 
a preface to this guide should be a reminder that fertility and achieving a pregnancy is not 
an exact science.  There are so many unknown factors influencing fertility, that even with 
all the advances in reproductive technology, conception remains as much an art as a 
science” (Egg Donation, Inc., 2004).  As refreshing as it may be to hear medical 
practitioners admit that they do not have all the answers, this preface seems to function as 
a disclaimer.  The implications of this caveat enable Egg Donation, Inc. to avoid a 
discussion on their website of the risks and health concerns – for both donors and 
recipients – that accompany egg donation and its success as measured by pregnancy. 
 EDP and Egg Donation, Inc.’s avoidance of any serious mention of the risks 
involved in being a donor on their websites clearly is a breech of the guidelines 
established by ASRM and supported by ART practitioners in their professional literature.  
In addition, both websites fail to acknowledge the possible coercive influence of financial 
compensation for donors, which yet again subverts the process of informed consent. 
Whereas the professional literature written by ART practitioners openly confronts and 
mollifies claims that paying egg donors’ results in their commodification and the 
potential for exploiting them, the donor program websites take a more subtle approach to 
silencing these critiques of egg donation.   
 The first step these websites take to avert accusations of exploiting donors or 
coercing them to participate through financial incentive is to make almost no mention of 
the fee women will receive for providing their eggs.  The EDP website makes just one 
brief mention of their $5000 fee to donors at the very end of the “Information for 
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Donors” page.  The Egg Donor, Inc. website appears to be even more elusive on the 
matter of donor fees.  This site makes a few references to the donor fee, such as 
participation in the program guarantees compensation for the donor and that the medical 
procedures will not begin until the “couple”9 has deposited the donor fee.  But throughout 
these references, Egg Donation, Inc. provides no specifics about the amount given for a 
completed cycle.   
 The potential for a different reading – one in which the minimal attention to donor 
fees on these sites is an attempt to minimize the manipulation of donors’ motives by the 
prospect of substantial monetary sums – certainly exists.  Yet, the extensive emphasis 
these websites place on another donor motive, namely altruism, suggests that these 
websites may be attempting to offset, or even mask the influence of financial motives in 
donors’ decisions.10   
 Maximizing the admirability of donor altruism 
 Both EDP and Egg Donors, Inc. incessantly characterize the donors in their 
programs as “kind-hearted,” “giving and big-hearted” people, and “empathetic” women 
who invariably have “humanitarian” motives or reasons for wanting to donate, a “lovely 
spirit,” and an immense desire and “willingness to help people.”  These websites also 
contain numerous references to the provision of one’s eggs as a “gift” or “precious gift” 
to the recipients.  Representations such as these contribute to the portrayal of donors as 
self-sacrificing and unconditionally good-natured people. 
 The thinly veiled efforts of these websites to portray altruism as their donors’ 
primary (and perhaps only) motive for participating is epitomized by a list of the 
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“motivations to become an egg donor” on the “A Typical Egg Donor Profile” page of the 
Egg Donation, Inc. website.  This list reads as follows: 
a. An opportunity to be of service and provide help 
b. Empathy for childless couples without having to carry a pregnancy for them 
c. Recognition of the importance of having children in their own lives 
d. Have a child that is intellectually gifted 
e. Pride in her genetic background and family looks 
f. An opportunity to make a unique contribution 
g. Financial gain for her family 
 
Based on all of the other evidence on this website, the listing of “financial gain” as the 
last possible motive for a donor is not merely coincidental.  Furthermore, in listing the 
financial benefits as a motive for donation because it would be a gain “for her family,” 
Egg Donation, Inc. has even converted monetary gain into an altruistic act by making it 
about her family’s needs rather than meeting her own needs!   
 In addition, much of the imagery on the websites (which I described earlier as 
nearly propaganda) perpetuates the notion of donors embodying the ideal of altruism.  
For instance, the logo on the EDP website, while somewhat difficult to decipher, appears 
to be an angel holding an infant.  This logo also coincides nicely with a series of pictures 
of the programs’ supposed “angels” (a.k.a. supermodel-caliber donors) that appears on 
the opening page of the site.  According to the sample donor profile provide on EDP’s 
general access website, the donors in their database are identified by their “Angel” 
number (e.g. Angel 9999). 
 Now take a moment to imagine if such images and descriptions were used to 
recruit and/or advertise sperm donors.  What if the “empathetic” Angel number 1834 was 
compelled to donate his sperm for “financial gain” for his family?  Alternatively, what if 
these supposed defining qualities were used in cases of people donating even more vital 
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organs such as kidneys?  Within these other contexts, these representations used to 
portray egg donors seem almost ridiculous! 
 The gendered assumptions embedded in ideas of egg donors’ altruism become 
evident when one acknowledges that kind-hearted, giving, and self-sacrificing are not 
characteristics typically used to describe sperm donors (Haimes, 1993).11  While these 
terms may in fact be applied to donors of other organs, the propagandistic and blatantly 
gendered quality of the imagery and portrayals of egg transfer make them unsuited for 
other types of donation.  
 To place as much emphasis on altruistic donor motives as these websites do, there 
must be something more invested in maintaining the images of egg donors’ more 
admirable motives – as opposed to their financial motives – than merely granting praise 
and acknowledgement to the good deeds of women donors.  As one point of insight to 
this assertion, the pages of both websites that provide information specifically to potential 
donors explain that the “typical donor” has a sincere interest in helping infertile people.  
This element of deciding to donate may well be the case for many women donors, but the 
compulsion of these two websites and most others like them to remind potential donors of 
why they might want to donate seems almost prescriptive.12  In light of such seemingly 
rigid doctrine, one must wonder what is at stake in believing that women might actually 
be indifferent enough to sell off pieces of their bodies, rather than donate their eggs out of 
some altruistic impulse. 
Coinciding Representations of Maximized Altruism and Minimized Risk  
 Altruism may undoubtedly be one factor that contributes to women’s decisions to 
donate their eggs.  Yet my analysis of the content of the EDP and Egg Donation, Inc. 
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websites suggests that the exaggerated attention these sites devote to the goodness of 
donors and the purely altruistic motives of their donation – specifically within contexts 
which ignore the risks of donation and the impact of substantial financial compensation – 
operates to eliminate any thought of these women being exploited.  When placing this 
analysis alongside of an examination of ART professional texts on egg transfer, it 
becomes clear that the anticipated audience largely dictates the level of ART 
practitioners’ disclosure about the risks donors face in terms of both the transfer 
procedures and the potential for being exploited.   
 With the fact that these incongruent representations of egg transfer – between the 
professional literature and donor program websites – are both created by ART 
practitioners, the purpose of the variation in representations must certainly be questioned.  
Ultimately, even though the disparity in representation of egg transfer may seem 
incongruous, the tendency of both types of representations is to offer practitioners and 
those who participate in egg transfer justification for its use.  Yet even this 
acknowledgement does not fully consider the complexity of the various representations 
of egg transfer and the intentions of all the people involved.   
 This chapter revealed the ways in which acknowledgement of the risks and 
complicating factors of egg transfer disappear between the discussions of egg transfer 
professionally and the representations fed to the general populace.  My observations and 
analyses of some ART professional texts on egg donation and two egg donor program 
websites offer some speculation and explanation of the particular functions served by the 
variation in representations of egg donation provided to the general public.  In 
scrutinizing these representations of egg transfer, I have somewhat unraveled 
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practitioners’ claims of working in the best interest of egg donors.  In the following 
chapters, I will interrogate more deeply the implications of the altruistic motives and 
financial compensation for donors, while keeping in mind these practitioner-produced 
and widely consumed representations of egg transfer. 
 
                                                 
1 My research suggests that the prominence and magnitude of professional and popular literature that 
specifically addresses the experiences of egg donors is largely overshadowed by that which considers the 
experiences of recipients.  While this fact is itself telling about the cultural significance that has been 
attributed to the role of donors, I think the larger story here lies in the content of the literature that does 
address the role of donors, and what that content says about practitioners’ beliefs and practices. 
2The known physical risks of being an egg donor have been identified as menopausal symptoms (e.g. hot 
flashes, vaginal dryness, and dyspareunia), or ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) due to hormonal 
regimens.  In rare instances, thromboembolism, stroke, or death have resulted.  Risks from needle injury, 
hemorrhage, and infection are also infrequent, but may result from the retrieval process, and could 
potentially affect sterilization.  The use of GnRH has been documented to result in a minimal number of 
unwanted pregnancies for the donor.  Speculation about long-term health consequences of donation suggest 
that there may be a link between the use of fertility drugs and later development of ovarian cancer, but no 
conclusive evidence exists to either support or discount this possibility (Morris, 1998).  Short and long-term 
psychological risks are also a factor.  They could include any outcomes ranging from temporary regret to 
difficulty later in life for the donor if she herself faces infertility (Handel, Vorzimer, & Shafton, 1998). 
3 The indicated report suggests that “Monetary compensation should reflect the time, inconvenience, and 
physical and emotional demands associated with the oocyte donation process” (pp.218-219).  Through an 
analysis of the ethical issues raised by egg donation, and a comparison with the typical rates of 
compensation for sperm donors, the Committee determines that “at this time sums of $5,000 or more 
require justification and sums above $10,000 go beyond what is appropriate” (Ethics Committee of the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2000, p.219). 
4 Corea (1991) offers a similar perspective of “technodocs” (a term self-selected by an ART practitioner) in 
her critique of a 1986 report by the American Fertility Society (a precursor to ASRM) titled “Ethical 
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies.”  Corea sarcastically comments, “Surprise: the 
technodocs determined, after 18 months of serious deliberation, that what they do is ethical” (p.71). 
5 The biographical notes about contributors in Sauer’s book indicate that Handel is affiliated with the 
Center for Surrogate Parenting and Egg Donation, Inc.  Thus, it is highly unlikely that this coincidence is 
merely a case of mistaken identity. 
6 The Egg Donor Program and Surrogacy Program does not indicate the abbreviation of its name through 
any acronyms.  Due to the length of this program’s name, I have created EDP as an acronym for my 
convenience and readability. 
7 The very fact that these images are intelligible within U.S. society speaks to the power of what Haraway 
(1997) terms “sociotechnical production.”  Haraway describes, “By sociotechnical productions I mean the 
knowledge-power processes that inscribe and materialize the world in some forms rather than others” (p. 
7).  In particular, Haraway goes on to comment on the significance of Christian influences (such as those I 
identified from the websites) on practicing science in the U.S.  She says, “Despite the extraordinary 
multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious populations in the United States, with quite various traditions of 
signifying time and community, U.S. scientific culture is replete with figures and stories that can only be 
called Christian.  Figural realism infuses Christian discourse in all of that religious tradition’s contested and 
polyvocal variety, and this kind of figuration shapes much of the technoscientific sense of history and 
progress” (p.10). 
8 While websites in general provide no certain evidence of whether a text was truly produced by the person 
who allegedly composed it, authorship really is not relevant to my argument here.  The fact is that these 
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representations of egg transfer exist, and as part of the content of the EDP website, these letters contribute 
to the perceptions of egg transfer, whether or not the letters are legitimate. 
9 EDP and Egg Donation, Inc. provide no indication of denying treatment to single women or lesbian 
couples – as seems to be true of many infertility clinics and egg donor programs.  Despite the absence of a 
discriminatory policy, the terminology that these programs and many like them utilize illustrates their 
assumption or belief that their clients will all be heterosexual (typically married) couples. 
10 In her article “Semen as Gift, Semen as Goods,” Tober (2001) made an identical observation of the focus 
placed on altruistic motives of ART-related websites which contained profiles of both sperm and egg 
donors.  She comments, “This focus on altruism is an attempt to remove such ‘donations’ from the realm of 
market transactions in order to imbue them with a higher meaning” (p.155).   
11 Although I have noted previously the inappropriateness of a parallel between egg donation and sperm 
donation, I am using the comparison in this particular instance to draw attention to the unproblematized 
deployment of specifically gendered norms in perspectives of the donation of women’s genetic material.  
12 The dogmatic fixation on donors’ altruistic motives and the poorly masked directives that they act upon 
such intentions certainly relates to Foucault’s (1977) notions of discipline and docile bodies.  The 
implications of these concepts for the case of egg donation will be considered more extensively in Chapter 
4.   
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Chapter 2 
Analyzing the ‘Choice’ and Gendered Assumptions behind Donation 
 
 
 In thinking about the emphasis within ART professional literature and websites 
that is placed on the altruism of a woman donating her eggs – and thus its resulting 
prominence in formulating popular perceptions of egg transfer – the designation of this 
ART as egg “donation” really is no surprise.  The very term “altruism” invokes notions of 
gift giving, sacrifice, and providing something of one’s own to another in need without 
any expectations of reimbursement.  By defining the practice of egg transfer as 
“donation” and the women who make it possible as “donors,” it becomes impossible to 
even think about these practices outside of contexts of altruism.   
Yet as Chapter 1 uncovered, the typical uses of egg transfer in the U.S. present 
several challenges to general assumptions of the altruism embedded within women’s 
decisions to donate their eggs.  Within these contexts, the emphasis placed on donors’ 
altruistic motives appears exaggerated and, as a result, becomes questionable.  Thus, this 
chapter will further deconstruct the notions set up in Chapter 1 that identified donors’ 
primary motives as purely altruistic. 
 In an attempt to look more critically at the significance of perceptions of altruism 
in the practices of egg donation I will consider a two-part premise upon which these ideas 
of altruism are based.  In order to establish the validity of the assumptions of donors’ 
altruistic drives to participate in egg transfer, one must believe that women choose to 
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donate their eggs, at least in some part, out of the goodness of their own hearts.  The first 
part of this premise, that women choose to donate, relies on a belief in women’s right to 
bodily autonomy.  The second half of the premise, in alignment with contemporary 
gendered assumptions of women’s nature, suggests that all egg donors are good-natured 
and kindhearted people.   
In this chapter, my intent is to look at the cultural ideologies and belief systems 
that enable the dominance of altruistic representations such as those that were identified 
in Chapter 1.  Specifically, I will draw out the weaknesses in informed consent, the 
manipulation of feminist ideologies, and the utilization of traditional gendered 
expectations, as representative of three central flaws in assumptions of egg donors’ 
altruism.  
Autonomy as a Basis for Altruism 
 Autonomy, the first assumed predicate of egg donors’ altruistic motives, is a 
complex philosophical idea that indicates voluntary and well informed actions, behaviors, 
and thoughts.  In terms of women’s reproductive decisions, the notion of autonomy 
concerns women’s ability and freedom to control what happens in and to their own 
bodies.  As discussed earlier, egg donors face a barrage of potential physical, emotional, 
and social consequences for volunteering their eggs.  Thus, when placed within the 
contexts of contemporary uses of egg transfer in the U.S., notions of autonomy become 
specific to women knowingly, and completely of their own volition, undertaking the 
various consequences of all related aspects of this ART (Dickens, 2001; Gurmankin, 
2001; Kuhse, 2001, Petchesky, 1995). 
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 Within this series of assertions, two central issues become relevant to women’s 
decisions to donate their eggs, and thus to their ability to altruistically choose to 
participate in egg transfer.  First, the status of egg donors’ autonomy (as is true of any 
individual) depends heavily upon their ability to give informed consent1 (Kuhse, 2001).  
The second issue derives from the fact that any discussion about women’s bodily 
autonomy in relation to topics of reproduction must inevitably intertwine with 
westernized perceptions of the importance of bodily integrity (Bordo, 1993) and 
feminists’ commitment to women’s reproductive freedom (Petchesky, 1996).  In an 
attempt to interrogate the degree to which discourses of egg donors’ bodily autonomy 
support the prevalent representations of altruism, the next part of this chapter will be 
devoted to investigating these issues of informed consent and constructs of reproductive 
freedom. 
 Difficulties in attaining informed consent 
 As Kuhse (2001) indicates, the autonomy of health care decisions in general are 
“captured in the notion of informed consent” (p.308).  She contends that conditions of 
being autonomous require that a decision to participate in an ART include, “adequate and 
accurate information and understanding of the potential risks and benefits of alternative 
courses of action, and that it be voluntary (that is, free from coercion and undue 
inducement)” (p.308).  Gurmankin (2001) seconds this view of informed consent when 
she claims, “It would violate the right to autonomy to withhold risk information that is 
crucial to the ability to weigh the costs and benefits of donating” (p.11).  Thus full 
disclosure to egg donors of the risks they undertake in participating in egg transfer have 
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been identified as one component that must be present for women to be able to make 
autonomous decisions. 
 As my readers will recall, Chapter 1 exhibits the emphasis which ART 
professional literature places on informed consent as a necessary component of the 
ethical use of egg transfer.  While conditions of informed consent seem unproblematic in 
theory, some difficulties arise when these principles are actually applied.  The previous 
chapter addresses one way in which informed consent may be impeded, by 
acknowledging that ART practitioners’ financial and professional gains – specifically 
from persuading women to donate their eggs – may lead them to minimize the risks 
associated with donation. 
 Yet, for complex reasons, even practitioners with the best intentions of fully 
adhering to procedures of informed consent may still fall short of facilitating autonomous 
decision-making by donors.  The possible failure of ART practitioners in assuring egg 
donor’s autonomous choice through the presence of informed consent is due to the fact 
that some ambiguity is inevitable.  Regardless of how clear the ASRM guidelines are 
about the protection of donors from unnecessary harm, the rather subjective question of 
what may actually count as harm to donors – or perhaps more accurately, unacceptable 
harm – makes the provision of informed consent much more complicated (Gurmankin, 
2001).   
 Are the use of hormones and the hyperstimulation of a donor’s ovaries 
excessively harmful to her now?  Will it be so twenty years from now?  Does deciding to 
disconnect from part of one’s body – in particular one’s genetic material – pose the threat 
of psychological or emotional harm to the donor?  Is it possible that the practices of egg 
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transfer may involve more risks to some donors than others based on factors that we may 
not even be able to anticipate due to the brief history of egg transfer?   
 Furthermore, can any harm be justified, seeing as donors undertake these risks for 
someone other than themselves?  Those who ground their theories within the significance 
of social networks may answer this last question affirmatively, or at least by asserting 
conditional agreement.  And, in previewing the discussion in the next chapter, what 
amount of money creates undue inducement – how is the exact monetary figure that 
crosses into the category of “excessive” determined?  Assuming that a compensatory 
sum, regardless of size, is provided, can donors’ participation be completely voluntary?   
 With all of these questions, and an infinite number of others, continuously 
circulating around the practices of egg transfer, can any ART practitioner definitively say 
that he or she can inform donors fully of the consequences of their decisions?  Certainly, 
based on problems in previous cases, practitioners are conscious of medical and health 
risks of which donors should be made aware.  However, there is no clear answer to the 
question of practitioners’ ability to ensure informed consent because, as I stated earlier, 
so many of the measures involved in this decision are subjective.   
While these are important questions that warrant consideration, it must be 
recognized that they are in actuality only inquiring about the theoretical status of 
informed consent.  The ways in which informed consent is used in the actual practices of 
egg transfer provide much greater room for variation in the level of information provided 
to, and understood by donors.  Two recent studies by Gurmankin (2001) and Kalfoglou & 
Geller (2000) provide some insight into actual experiences of donors in terms of 
informed consent.   
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Gurmankin’s study investigated the level of disclosure about the risks to potential 
egg donors during a preliminary inquiry phone call.  Of nineteen donor programs 
Gurmakin polled, 57% were found to provide potential donors with risk information that 
was inaccurate or incomplete in some ways.  Gurmankin acknowledges that her study 
applies specifically to the preliminary contact between potential donors and donor 
programs, and therefore may not be completely representative of the information that the 
programs offer donors before receiving their consent.  Even still, Gurmankin cites 
research suggesting that people’s decisions made in analogous situations are often 
influenced by the initial information people receive.  Gurmankin also comments that 
donors, having actually visited the donor program offices, may feel committed to donate 
prior to becoming fully informed.   
 In a study of donors’ relationships to the lawyers, psychologists, and health care 
providers involved with egg donation, Kalfoglou & Geller (2000) found that 
approximately half of the 33 donors whom they interviewed indicated that the care and 
information they received were not at all influenced by the fact that they were being paid 
or that they were receiving treatment for the benefit of another (paying) patient.  Thus, 
based on the findings from these studies that show informed consent to be inconsistently 
applied, the presence of informed consent appears to be hit or miss, depending on both 
the practitioners and donors involved. 
 In general, all commentators – those working inside the ART field, as well as 
those critiquing it – seem to indicate that if donors were simply provided with informed 
consent, their autonomy would be maintained in choosing to participate.  But clearly this 
issue goes beyond the complexities of whether donors are receiving informed consent, to 
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questions of what values are being prioritized by the specific content and what quality of 
the information that is thought to enable autonomous decision-making.   
 Appropriation of pro-choice rhetoric or empowerment? 
 
Long a feminist of a liberal stripe, I did not want to think that this was a choice I 
should not have.  I did not want to think that this is a choice no one should have. 
      (Blacksher, 2000, p. 30).   
 
 While general ideas of autonomy are central to many philosophies about human 
rights, woman-specific conceptions of bodily autonomy are deeply embedded within 
feminist histories of women’s battles against discrimination and oppression.  Women’s 
bodies have historically been recurrent sites of sexual, reproductive, and labor-based 
exploitation and abuse which have functioned as central sources of women’s oppression 
(Petchesky, 1995, Raymond, 1993).   
In recognition of such dynamics, many of the objectives of women’s movements 
around the world have been to empower women in reclaiming ownership of, and control 
over their own bodies.  Petchesky (1995) indicates that assertions of women’s bodily 
autonomy are empowering for women both personally and as a political collectivity.  She 
describes that for many women’s movements around the globe, “the idea of women 
owning their bodies is .  .  .  not an individualist, exclusionary interest but rather a 
fundamental condition for women’s development and strength as a social group and thus 
for their full participation as citizens” (p.403).  This excerpt indicates that even though 
bodily autonomy is an is sue of each woman having the power to control her own body, 
this empowerment of individual women has implications for the status of all women.  As 
such, ideas of women’s ability to control their own bodies – specifically through access 
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to safe, legal abortion and birth control – has been a core element of historical and 
contemporary western feminist battles for all women’s liberation and empowerment.2 
 The implications of altruistic representations and conceptions of egg transfer that 
paint donor participation as women’s “choice” thus necessarily invokes this history of 
feminist struggle (subRosa, 2002).  Yet even as several generations of feminists have 
logged many victories for women’s bodily autonomy in all spheres of life, numerous gray 
areas which continue to complicate women’s rights to control their own bodies remain – 
particularly when issues of race, class, ability and sexual orientation are factored in.3  
Contemporary contexts of reproduction – which are largely defined by the increasing use 
of new ARTs, and are equally shaped by racial, class, and other forms of social 
inequality4 – compose just one such area in which women’s right to autonomy remains 
hazy.  In part, these unclear definitions are a reflection of even feminists’ inability to 
unanimously assert definitive components of women’s bodily autonomy and reproductive 
freedom.   
 As Rosemarie Tong (1996) demonstrates in her essay “Toward a Feminist 
Perspective on Gamete Donation and Reception Policies,” different groups of feminists 
have supported or contested the use of egg transfer based on their varying perceptions of 
what counts as women’s autonomy.  According to Tong, some approach egg transfer 
from a “Marxist feminist” perspective in which women’s “choice” to donate her eggs 
merely reflects the selection of the “lesser of two evils” (p.143) – i.e. the “choice” of 
suffering in conditions of poverty, or of endangering her health by subjecting her body to 
the capitalist practice of selling her eggs.   
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Similarly, those who Tong terms “radical feminists” see the potential donors’ 
“choice” as lying between two negative options, but they believe that the option 
involving exploitation may have some other basis than economics.  The radical feminist 
perspective problematizes egg donation further by indicating that “it is a process under 
the control of both the medical establishment and profiteering infertility clinic” (Tong, 
1996, p. 145), and thereby is out of women’s control.   
 In contrast to Marxist and radical feminist perspectives, those who approach egg 
transfer from what Tong terms a “liberal feminist” perspective support both anonymity 
and monetary compensation for donors.  In assuming the presence of informed consent, 
liberal feminists contend that failing to pay egg donors for their efforts, time, and 
inconvenience would be the true source of women’s exploitation within the use of this 
ART.  The liberal feminist viewpoint thus acknowledges that women may very well be 
motivated to donate eggs by the promise of financial gain.  However, they condition their 
support of these practices on the presence of informed consent. 
 As is evident in the Marxist, radical, and liberal feminist perspectives on egg 
transfer that Tong outlined, feminists work from at least two somewhat conflicting 
notions of women’s bodily autonomy.  Radical and Marxist feminists theorize from the 
belief that women do not have autonomy because of the forces of oppression in their 
lives.  Whether women are oppressed on the basis of their sex, class, race, or other 
characteristics, they will not be able to attain bodily autonomy unless all forms of 
oppression are eradicated.  However, liberal feminists view women’s autonomy as pre-
existing, or part of the human condition, which thus leads to the conclusion that women’s 
“choice” is evidence of their autonomy.  Thus, even though all feminists are concerned 
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with protecting the rights and welfare of donors, their beliefs about how to go about 
doing that may be grounded in completely contradictory theoretical perspectives.   
 Now surely the liberation battles fought by feminists for social, economic, legal, 
and reproductive rights were not waged to ensure that the women of the 21st century (or 
any other time period, for that matter) would have the right to profit from the direct sale 
of their bodies.  Or were they?  Perhaps these battles waged by feminists across the 
decades were designed to liberate women in order to make these sorts of decisions within 
the contexts of their own lives.  Is it not possible that the battles for choice and autonomy 
were meant to say that, “Provided that a woman is legally competent and a medically 
appropriate candidate for gamete donation or, as the case may be, gamete reception, it is 
her business whether she decides to sell her eggs to help her way through college or, 
whether at the postmenopausal age of 55, she decides to purchase an egg in order to get 
pregnant” (Tong, 1996, p.143; my emphasis).  Clearly, if a solution to this puzzle of how 
all women’s autonomy can be established and protected exists, it will not be simple. 
 Even though varying theoretical frameworks may be employed, this brief 
acknowledgement of the basic premises that many feminists contend must be present in 
order for women’s bodily autonomy to exist hints that the contemporary uses of egg 
transfer seem to fall short of protecting women’s autonomy.  In situations in which the 
provision of informed consent is uncertain and the amount of appropriate compensation 
(if any) seems impossible to determine, the status of women’s bodily autonomy seems to 
remain equally precarious.  As such, the practices of egg transfer, as they are currently 
used in the United States, seem to only provide fuel for Petchesky’s assertion that “For 
women’s movements globally, the idea that a woman owns her body stands not as a 
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description of reality but as a rhetorical achievement” (1996, p.403).  In this statement, 
Petchesky is basically suggesting that bodily ownership – and thus implicitly autonomy – 
do not exist beyond a mere theoretical ideal.   
 Yet, as is evidenced in the feminist views of egg transfer I just discussed and the 
overall emphasis on altruism in representations and discussions of its practice, some 
feminists and non-feminists alike are utilizing the presumption that women do have 
bodily autonomy and thus can make free and informed choices about their reproductive 
capabilities.  So, in actuality, Petchesky’s statement, while raising an important question 
about exactly what the status of women’s bodily autonomy is, really drives more to the 
heart of the problems that arise from embedding discourses of donors’ altruism within 
feminist notions of choice and women’s right to control their own bodies.   
This problem is one that similarly has been identified by subRosa’s (2002) article 
“Stolen Rhetoric: The appropriation of choice by the ART Industry.”  In this article, 
subRosa suggests that “a politics of autonomy and liberation had been transformed into a 
rhetoric of ‘choice’ .  .  .  which became identified with the pro-choice movement” 
(pp.135-136).  They later go on to claim that “the rhetoric of choice is used to make 
controversial issues acceptable” (p.139).  In the contexts of my current discussion, 
subRosa’s assertions about the appropriation of pro-choice rhetoric can equally be 
applied to the hyper-emphasis on altruism within representations of egg donation.  By 
applying the heavily invested feminist notions of “choice” to the practices of egg 
donation, a woman’s decision to donate her eggs appears to be embracing and even 
furthering notions of women’s reproductive freedoms – an argument which seems to be 
completely overshadowing any real exploration of how egg transfer might be affecting 
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women’s reproductive rights.  In pairing donors’ supposed altruism with “choice” in this 
way, feminist demands for women’s full control of their bodies are undermined.   
Assumptions of Women’s “Natural” Altruism 
 In the United Kingdom, where payment to sperm donors is acceptable but 
payment to egg donors has been deemed inappropriate, “it is assumed that women will 
donate for altruistic motives” (Fielding, et. al, 1999, p.274).  This assumption suggests 
that there is something about women – something embedded in their biology or nature – 
that compels them to act on an altruistic basis.  The situation in the U.K. obviously 
cannot directly speak to the specific ideologies behind use of egg donors in the U.S.  At 
the same time, the highly emphasized representations of donors’ altruistic motives that 
were revealed in Chapter 1 indicate that a cross-cultural parallel does in fact exist.  This 
correlation presents a clear example of the second premise upon which ideas of egg 
donors’ altruism seem to lie – i.e. that all egg donors are good-natured and kindhearted 
women.   
 This second premise of donors’ altruism is a little less difficult to explain because 
it is directly drawn from gendered notions of womanhood that are filtered throughout all 
of our everyday interactions.  Specifically, the emphasis placed on donors’ altruism is 
asserted on the basis of women’s assumed “natural” roles as nurturers and mothers 
(Haimes, 1993; Wilding, 1999,’ Hartouni, 1997).  In other words, the success of 
representations of donors’ altruistic motives lie deeply embedded in societal notions of 
what it means to inhabit the very position of “woman.”  Raymond (1993) articulates the 
basis of this relationship between womanhood and altruism nicely in stating, “The 
cultural norm of the altruistic woman who is infinitely giving and eternally accessible 
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derives from a social context in which women give and are given away, but also from a 
moral tradition that celebrates women’s duty to meet and satisfy the needs of others” (p. 
50).  Raymond’s description here explains how our societal norms both shape and reward 
the enactments of womanhood that embrace altruism as a guideline for every aspect of 
women’s existence.5  
 In speaking specifically of U.S. culture, Tong (1996) extends this ideology 
identified by Raymond to the situation of egg donors.  Tong comments on the ways in 
which society has not only established the assumption that egg donors are altruistic, but 
even provides a means for making such an assumption true by engraining in women’s 
minds the idea that they must embrace altruistic roles in order even to be considered a 
woman.  Tong states, “we live in a society that repeatedly teaches women that it is 
women’s role to be the givers par excellence .  .  .  many women feel guilty if they are not 
as self-sacrificial as possible – if they are not giving other people everything they can 
give them, including their sexual and reproductive services” (Tong, 1996, p. 144).  
Raymond (1993) further accentuates the ideas expressed by Tong in saying,  
It is the discourse of maternalism, which traditionally has equated devotion and 
dedication with women abandoning their own needs.  It is also the discourse of 
maternal destiny in which a real woman is a mother or one who acts like a 
mother or, more specifically, one who acts like the self-sacrificing, nurturant, and 
caretaking mother a woman is supposed to be (p.51). 
 
Thus, this idea of donors as altruistic fits right into, and simultaneously privileges certain 
cultural narratives of womanhood over others.  Furthermore, Tong’s suggestion that 
women may feel guilt or regret for not adequately meeting societal expectations of 
women’s self-sacrifice, points to the self-policing in which women engage to adhere to 
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societal gender norms and the definitions that Raymond identifies (i.e. self-sacrificial, 
nurturing, caretaking).6   
 Not only do the assumptions and exaggerated representations of donors’ altruistic 
nature portray them as humanitarian members of society, but they often rely on the 
powerful equation of a donor as a generous, kindhearted person within familial or kinship 
contexts (Haimes, 1993).7  For this reason, the narratives focusing on women as care-
giving show how their familial and societal roles position them in ways that make a 
request to be a “known” donor from a family member or friend nearly impossible to 
refuse.  Tong asserts this fact when she says, “Women typically find it very difficult to 
disappoint friends and relatives – to refuse to help them in their hour of need” (Tong, 
1996, p. 144). 
 While recognizing the impacts of familial and kinship association to discourses of 
altruism, Strathern (1995) explains how such notions of kinship are broadened to account 
for situations utilizing ARTs (including egg transfer) in which familial blood 
relationships are absent.  She states,  
making visible the detachment of the procreative act from the way the family 
produces a child adds new possibilities to the conceptualization of intimacy in 
relationships.  However minimal the role of those involved, dispersed 
conception may provide a model for relations that can take on a kinship 
character even where they cannot take on a family one (p. 353).   
 
Strathern’s assertion here points to the fact that although narratives of altruism end up 
building off of women’s sense of obligation to people whom they care about, these 
feelings of relation may ultimately be extended to people whom the donors may not even 
know.  
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 The discourses of altruism and kinship become even more powerful through 
frequent mention of the fact that some (though the image producers would rather their 
audience believe it to be a typical characteristic) donors have children of their own – and 
presumably husbands too, of course.  In the eyes of potential egg recipients, suggestions 
that many donors are already mothers offers them reassurance that the donors’ eggs are 
likely to be viable.  Such implications – based in ideologies that frame motherhood as 
“the essence or pinnacle of female existences” (Raymond, 1993, p. 29) – also affirm that 
the donor is caring and nurturing, and thus must be motivated to donate by her altruistic 
nature.   
 Although familial ties and obligations may be strong motivating factors for 
women who are in the positions just mentioned, the fact remains that many women are 
not already parents when donating their eggs, and they donate their eggs anonymously.  
Thus, forwarding representations of donors as altruistic members of family networks 
functions to communicate the acceptability of egg donation as proper womanly behavior.  
After all, if the models of womanhood – i.e. (white, heterosexual, middle-class) mothers 
and extremely family-oriented women – can express their love and concern for the ir 
family by donating their eggs either to relatives or close friends, or even to unknown 
couples who undoubtedly deserve the wonderful family life they have themselves, 
certainly it must be an appropriate act of womanhood to donate one’s eggs.  In other 
words, egg donation comes to define womanhood itself. 
 Wilding (2002) really draws forth this function of the numerous altruistic 
representations of egg donation in saying, “marketing cynically plays on the so-called 
‘natural maternal instinct’ ascribed to all women.  The cyberbaby industry exploits 
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women’s assumed ‘need’ to produce children, in some form or other, in service of ever 
expanding technological intervention into the body – for profit.  Donor ads seem to 
appeal to the donor’s empathy and generosity.”  And in appealing to that empathy and 
generosity, recruitment of donors and representations of such practices both invoke and 
reify the cultural beliefs that giving and self-sacrifice are synonymous with women’s 
nature. 
Disrupted Assumptions of Altruism 
 With the apparent power and predominance of notions of “choice” and altruism 
throughout representations and discussions of egg transfer, one must wonder what it 
means for women to encounter such narratives.  For women who are uncertain about 
offering their eggs for transfer, insinuations that egg donation is demonstrative of 
culturally valued qualities – i.e. those of reproductive freedom for women and the 
gendered expectations of females’ kindness, sacrifice, and overall maternal instincts – 
may offer reassurance, or even justification for women’s decisions to donate.   
 However, the flaws in assumptions of women’s altruism that are examined in this 
chapter indicate that uncritically accepting the ideologies embedded in these discourses 
denies the much broader complexities that are factored into donors’ decisions.  Even the 
present practices of egg transfer in the United States suggest that altruistic feelings alone 
do not provide enough incentive to motivate many women to donate their eggs.  For 
instance, even as Kuhse (2001) suggests that, “donations – to the extent that they do not 
involve substantial payments – are clearly altruistic and beyond the call of duty” (p.310), 
she ultimately concedes tha t in the presence of substantial sums, egg donors may be more 
motivated by monetary compensation than altruism.   
 52 
 As a study of egg donors’ experiences conducted by Kalfoglou & Geller (2000) 
suggests, sizable sums of money, which are involved in many of the egg transfers in the 
U.S., do play a very real role in influencing women’s decisions to donate.  Yet even more 
interestingly, this study suggests that donors are well aware of the expectations that their 
motives are based in altruism.  Kalfoglou & Geller (2000) found that during their 
meetings with psychologists as part of the screening processes for donor selection, some 
women felt the need to downplay their financial motivation “because they thought it 
would look bad” (p. 228).  This example alone reveals only a few of the problems 
associated with the countless instances of exaggerated emphasis placed on altruism being 
the primary, or perhaps only motive for women to donate.   
 In bringing forth the contexts of limited definitions of informed consent, 
manipulation of feminist notions of “choice,” and the utilization of traditional 
expectations of womanhood, this chapter has raised the question of whether the actions of 
egg donors may be viewed as altruistic at all, let alone primarily motivated by altruism.8  
But even in adhering to the more common conceptions of altruism, this chapter has, at a 
minimum, significantly weakened the assumed basis on which donors’ altruism is 
founded.  By theoretically unpacking these premises of the presumption of donor 
altruism, the discussion in this chapter has disrupted the assumptions of altruism as egg 
donors’ primary motive.  In doing so, I have revealed common discourses of egg transfer 
to be falsely representing the actual utilization of egg transfer in the U.S. 
 
                                                 
1 Susan Bordo’s (1993) explanation of informed consent seems particularly useful in these contexts of egg 
transfer, and reproductive processes more broadly.  She states, “The doctrine of informed consent is, in a 
very real sense, a protection of the subjectivity of the person involved – that is, it is an acknowledgement 
that the body can never be regarded merely as a site of quantifiable processes that can be assessed 
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objectively, but must be treated as invested with personal meaning, history, and value that are ultimately 
determinable only by the subject who lives ‘within’ it” (pp.73-74; emphasis in the original).  
2 As numerous feminist academics and activists from around the world have observed, the individualistic 
concerns of North American and “western” feminist movements, which focus on such issues as body 
politics and reproductive rights, may not represent the most pressing concerns of women’s movement in 
various regions around the globe.  See for example, Mikell (1995).  Correa & Petchesky (1994), expand 
this discussion by pointing out that when western feminists consider issues of reproductive rights, they may 
overlook concerns of “maternal and infant mortality, infertility, unwanted sterilization, malnutrition of girls 
and women, female genital mutilation, sexual violence, and sexually transmitted diseases” (p.89) that shape 
the reproductive decisions of women all over the world.   
3 Bordo (1993) provides several examples of how women who are marginalized (i.e. women who are not 
white, middle class, heterosexual, and able-bodied) are least likely to have benefited from feminist victories 
in terms of reproductive freedoms.  Bordo evidences this assertion through a parallel of historical 
sterilization abuses based on racist and ableist eugenics to contemporary sterilization (and Norplant) abuses 
against women on welfare.  (See also Davis, 1991). 
4 According to Hartouni (1997), “the incidence of infertility is one and a half times higher among poorer, 
nonwhite populations than in middle-class white ones, or higher in precisely those ‘segments of our 
society’ in whom medical science appears to have the least interest and who, in any event, have the least 
access to its assistance” (p.75). 
5 Many of the theoretical analyses on which I have drawn to show that the links between altruism, 
motherhood, and the gendered expectations that women encounter, are blatantly lacking a critical 
consciousness of the implications of racial and class identities to these issues.  In particular, a discussion of 
how such identity markers influence perspectives of “fit” mothers greatly affects the clarity of the 
assumptions that womanhood, motherhood, and altruism are synonymous (see Hartouni, 1997, Davis, 
1991).  Such a critique deserves much greater consideration than I can provide here.  However, I think it is 
necessary to note that racial and class differences are conspicuously absent from both popular and 
professional representations of egg transfer as well as representations of the women who donate their eggs. 
6 My reference to self-policing carries obvious reference to Foucault’s (1977) ideas of the ways in which 
power works through disciplinary, rather than physically punitive means.  In this sense, social norms are 
maintained through individual self-surveillance and self-correction rather than the dictates of an authority.   
7 Raymond (1993) describes a parallel expectation within relations of surrogacy.  She states, “When a 
surrogate arrangement is represented as generosity to a family member in need, the ideal of altruism binds 
the woman to the norms of family duty” (p.54).   
8A more fundamental question that may be relevant here is whether any action can be interpreted as 
altruistic, regardless of whether it is embedded in the processes of capitalism.  As several social 
psychologists have argued, many of the actions that are typically perceived by be altruistic may actually 
reflect egoistic involvement where the actor is enacting helping behavior to either avoid punishment or gain 
rewards for  him or herself.  These researchers have thus defined true altruism as “a motivational state with 
the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare” that is qualified by a desire to help regardless of the 
potential reward or punishment involved.  Despite these findings, many of these psychologists still view 
both altruistic and egoistically motivated helping behavior positively because of its “prosocial” impacts 
(Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995). 
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Chapter 3  
Deciphering Donor Fees: The dynamics of commodifying and exploiting egg donors 
 
 By somewhat deflating the certainty of donor altruism, the arguments posed in 
Chapter 2 have opened the door for consideration of another influential factor that has 
been lurking in the shadows – namely, the motive of financial gain.  In critiquing the 
vagueness of the ASRM guidelines for monetary compensation to donors in Chapter 1, I 
raised the question, “At what level of monetary compensation does the financial incentive 
become ‘undue inducement’?”  While this question is certainly relevant to contemporary 
uses of egg transfer in the U.S., perhaps a more broadly probing question would inquire 
why the U.S. is the only country that allows the payment of sizable fees to donors.  The 
reasoning implicated in both of these considerations requires thorough interrogation to 
elucidate the significance of financial compensation in shaping donors’ decisions and 
experiences.   
 In attempting to establish expectations for ethical use of egg transfer, ART 
practitioners and feminists alike have argued both sides of the payment debate – one side 
contending that financial compensation, or sums of specific amounts are resulting in 
donor exploitation because they are being coerced into the decision to donate; the 
opposing position claiming that not paying women for the time and inconveniences they 
undertake in donating their eggs would result in exploitation (subRosa, 2002; Dickens, 
2001; Macklin, 1996).  In an effort to decipher the impacts of substantial compensation 
 55 
payments, this chapter will consider the complexities of both sides of the debate about the 
potential for commodification and exploitation of egg donors and their bodies. 
What is the Donor Fee for? 
Debates of whether the practices of egg transfer result in the commodification of 
donors’ eggs are rooted in the question of exactly what is being compensated for by the 
donor fee.  The argument that payment of the donor fee in direct exchange for a woman’s 
eggs is not commodification is impossible to defend.  The very meaning of the word 
“commodification” indicates that objects – in this case, the donor’s eggs – are used in 
such a way that they provide an advantage (financial or otherwise), or that they are made 
into objects of commerce.   
To combat the automatic equation of payment with commodification, many 
people who support the issuance of financial compensation to donors contend that donors 
receive remuneration for their time and effort, rather than the reproductive pieces of their 
bodies.  Although they provide no justification or evidence for their claims, the ASRM 
Ethics Committee contends that “Compensation based on a reasonable assessment of the 
time, inconvenience, and discomfort associated with oocyte retrieval can be distinguished 
from payment for the oocytes themselves” (2000, p. 217).  As supposed evidence of this, 
ASRM (2002) indicates that donors should be compensated for their time and efforts 
regardless of the clinical outcome of the transfer.  In other words, the donor fee should 
not be dependent upon the number of eggs retrieved (if any at all), nor their employment 
in a successful pregnancy. 
 At a first glance, basing arguments in support of payment on the grounds that 
donors’ compensation is not outcome-based seems perfectly reasonable.  Yet upon closer 
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examination, this perception may prove to contain some inherent flaws.  One commonly 
unexamined problem emerging from this logic lies in the claim that the financial 
compensation of donors is, in part, to offset the inconveniences and discomfort that may 
result from their participation in egg transfer.  Admittedly, proponents of donor 
compensation argue that donors’ eggs are not being commodified by this process, never 
making any mention of the potential for commodifying women’s bodies in general.  Yet 
one might argue that the provision of donor fees as compensation for the health risks and 
(perceivably unwelcome) bodily changes that may result from donating is commodifying 
donors’ bodies and health status (Dickens, 2001; Kuhse, 2001).   
 In addition, this set of practices involves the removal of reproductive cells from 
donors’ bodies and thus has very real impacts and consequences on their bodies.  As 
such, can a donor possibly weigh the prospects of payment for her time and effort as 
separate from the idea that she is being paid for the pieces of her body being extracted 
during her participation in egg transfer?  In providing donors monetary compensation for 
accepting conditions that directly impact their bodies, how can donors’ bodies 
conceivably not be commodified by this process?  Yet, proponents of donor fees continue 
to utilize the language of compensating donors for their “time and inconvenience” so as 
to avoid accusations of commodifying women’s bodies. 
 Another rarely considered reading of the use of donor fees is that, if donors are in 
fact being financially compensated for their time rather than their eggs – perhaps because 
payment for eggs is viewed as too crude and capitalistic – why is the commodification of 
donors’ time not seen as unethical as well (Macklin, 1996)?1  Perhaps our grounding in a 
capitalistic society makes it seem perfectly reasonable for people to be paid for time spent 
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doing something for another – in other words, their labor.  Or as Macklin (1996) 
describes, “The implication .  .  .  seems to be that payment to people for their services is 
ethically permissible but paying them for bodily products is not.  Payment to women for 
time and effort sounds like paying people for their work, surely an ethically acceptable if 
not obligatory social practice” (p.109).  However, the failure to acknowledge the 
reproductive nature of the labor performed by egg donors in the time for which they are 
paid seems to draw on historically prevalent ideas that women’s reproductive labor 
should be required as unpaid work.  To unquestioningly assume that women’s time, but 
not their reproductive labor should be monetarily valued, takes for granted many of our 
cultural beliefs about both assigning value, and women’s worth.  But more importantly, 
doing so fails to recognize that the labor for which women will be compensated is 
performed in, and by the very bodies that are purportedly not being commodified by 
payment to donors.   
 On the whole, this question of whether it is possible to separate compensation for 
time from payment for eggs is phenomenologically impossible for even donors 
themselves – let alone policy makers – to answer.  Yet perhaps a consideration of a 
hypothetical situation in which this donation scenario is able to occur separate from 
donor women’s bodies may offer some additional theoretical perspective.  Suppose that, 
instead of donating eggs produced by a woman’s ovary, donor women were able to 
artificially manufacture eggs to give to an infertile woman.  As within any good capitalist 
system such as ours, it would be anticipated that these donor women would be 
compensated for their time and efforts in producing these eggs.  In this scenario, how 
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could the donor woman not see the payment she receives as being for her eggs – i.e. the 
products of her labor?   
 Even in considering the argument by many supporters of donor fees – that women 
are compensated regardless of the clinical outcome – the dynamics of a capitalist system 
automatically anticipate that some products will be flawed, or not suitable for sale.  Yet 
even in such instances, laborers are still paid for their work – or in the case of this 
example, their work as egg makers.  So using the argument that women are compensated 
regardless of the clinical outcome to indicate that donors are not being paid for their eggs 
seems to be marred on several counts.  For advocates of compensation to base their 
argument on the irrelevance of clinical outcome is the equivalent of saying that donors 
would be just as likely to be compensated for providing finely crafted, intricately and 
uniquely designed Easter eggs as the eggs created by their ovaries, which is clearly just 
absurd.   
 Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that any donors would receive monetary 
compensation without proof that this procedure is successful.  Unless ART users and 
practitioners can anticipate that the majority of egg retrievals will produce numerous eggs 
for fertilization, it would be unprofitable to maintain a policy of compensating donors on 
the basis of their time and inconvenience rather than the actual number of eggs retrieved. 
With the highest success rates of all ART procedures in terms of pregnancies and live 
births, egg transfer clearly has a history that indicates the likelihood of such desirable 
outcomes.  These success rates thus serve to justify payment for donors’ participation 
rather than their eggs.   
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A final flaw in the contentions that egg donors are not paid for their eggs 
generates from the fact that egg donors in the U.S. are not compensated uniformly.  
Whereas most donors will receive fees between $2,500 and $5,000, depending on 
geographical region and practitioners’ preferences, some instances have recorded much 
higher sums being awarded to donors – at times in excess of $50,000 (Gurmankin, 2000).  
These instances are due in large part to what Becker (2000) describes as marketing 
“designer eggs” (p.153), in which the “pedigree” or characteristics (e.g. intelligence, 
ethnicity, athleticism, appearance, etc.) of donors become major determinants of the 
amount they can procure for donating.  If donors were truly being compensated for the 
time and effort exerted through numerous clinic visits, injections of hormones, and 
ultrasounds, not to mention the tedious screening processes and the actual retrieval 
process itself, why would they all not receive uniform compensation?  2  Thus, the 
numerous holes in this proclaimed intent of donor fees suggest that claiming women are 
paid for their labor rather than their eggs is untenable in actual practice.   
However, the more troubling implications of supposedly paying women for their 
time and inconvenience, instead of their eggs, is that doing so positions women’s eggs 
(and their reproductive capabilities in general) as completely abstracted from the rest of 
women’s bodies.  The contexts of egg transfer that I have brought forth in this 
examination of commodification clearly indicate that women’s bodies – much more so 
than their schedules – are bearing the costs of participating in egg transfer.   
Considering the bodily consequences of egg transfer, contending that donor fees 
are not compensating for the costs women’s bodies are incurring – including lost eggs – 
is insulting.  In this light, the involvement of financial compensation does seem to result 
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in the commodification of donated eggs – and by implication, donors’ bodies – regardless 
of whether or not that is the direct intent of payment.3   Thus, the following discussion 
will proceed from this deduction that both donors’ eggs and bodies are commodified 
during egg transfer, when sizable compensation for donors is present.   
Does this Form of Commodification Evolve into Exploitation? 
 As the previous section demonstrates, the contemporary uses of egg transfer in the 
United States (i.e. those in which payments to donors are acceptable) result in the 
commodification of donors’ bodies and reproductive body parts.  The extensive lengths 
to which ART practitioners, users, donors themselves, and society in general go in order 
to forward romanticized narratives and representations that do not  point to the 
commodification of donors’ eggs makes apparent our presumption that commodifying 
bodies and their parts is an undesirable or unacceptable condition.  But what exactly is it 
about the idea of commodifying bodies that we find so unsavory?  Or, as Nancy Scheper-
Hughes (2001) questions, “Why are markets in human bodies, body parts, sexual favors, 
reproductive material or blood sports (like boxing) so disturbing, so hard to take” (p.2)?   
 Establishing the relationship between commodification and exploitation 
 Becker (2000) offers a response to Scheper-Hughes’ question which seems to 
strike at the core of our discomfort over the idea of commodifying donor bodies and 
parts.  She states, “The commodification of donor gametes represents an ethical dilemma 
for many people because it raises questions of disenfranchisement and exploitation” 
(Becker, 2000, p.153).  As Becker suggests the notion that we could market and profit 
from our bodies is not what is offensive to society.  Rather the implications that such 
capitalistic practices could both unfairly take advantage of, and disempower the people 
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whose bodies are marketed provides the basis for concerns about exploiting donors.  Yet 
Becker’s statement indicates that the processes of commodification are not necessarily 
always accompanied by exploitation – she merely notes that such possibilities do exist.  
This suggestion, however, indicates that even though women’s bodies are commodified 
by egg transfer does not necessarily mean that egg donors are being exploited.   
 As a comparative situation in which exploitation supposedly remains absent from 
commodification, Blacksher (2000) acknowledges that the capitalistic contexts in which 
we live often encourage people to utilize their talents and characteristics for personal and 
financial gain.  She suggests that most people ultimately commodify some part of 
themselves to advance in the world.  She says,  
 
people sell all sorts of things that are importantly a part of them.  We are 
encouraged to develop and maintain personal and professional capacities and 
talents so we can do just that: market them.  People cultivate and hone their 
analytic capacities, their athletic and musical talents, their entrepreneurial know-
how, even their physical beauty, to earn a fee, make a living.  Why not my eggs? 
(p. 30).   
 
As Blacksher inquires, what is it about financial compensation for women’s reproductive 
material that produces such a sharp reaction when we spend so much of the rest of our 
lives selling our best qualities to get by?   
In applying the logic that Blacksher uses above, might it also be possible to 
conclude that the bodies of egg donors have been commodified in ways that avoid the 
detriment of exploitation, and as such are purely beneficial to all parties involved?  Is the 
commodification of women’s eggs justifiable if situations of exploitation are occluded?  
And if so, why is most of American society persistent in demanding that donor fees are 
not payment for women’s eggs? 
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 Any attempt to answer these questions – as Blacksher indicates – requires 
consideration of whether donors are being disempowered or taken advantage of in the 
process of egg transfer.  Based on current uses of egg transfer in the U.S., these questions 
necessarily raise the three issues of appropriate levels of compensation, the 
implementation of informed consent, and donor vulnerability.  The careful deployment of 
discourses demonstrating adequate donor fees, proper informed consent, and measures to 
protect vulnerable potential donors, provide strategic support to the use of egg transfer by 
making the exploitation of donors seem impossible.  However the strength of these 
supposed protections of potential donors is questionable at best. 
 The issue of whether donors are being appropriately compensated for the transfer 
of their commodities (i.e. their eggs) to recipients is actually indeterminable.  In 
considering whether donors are receiving either more or less money than their eggs are 
worth, one encounters a philosophical and ethical conundrum.  As potential sources of 
human life, women’s eggs are invaluable because to name any sum, no matter how high, 
would devalue and disregard the inherent dignity of human life (The Ethics Committee of 
the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, 2000).  On the other hand, it can be 
argued that donor women’s eggs, when left to disintegrate in the ovary, are valueless 
because they are resources that the donors themselves do not intend to use (Macklin, 
1996).4  Thus, the “appropriateness” of the level of compensation for the commodity 
transfer in egg donation is impossible to assess due to the fact that eggs can 
simultaneously be priceless and worthless.  Therefore determining a suitable payment for 
eggs is ineffective as a gauge for whether donors are being exploited. 
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 Turning to an examination of donors’ vulnerability to being exploited provides 
another, perhaps more useful, measure of whether egg donation disempowers or takes 
advantage of them.  The component of informed consent that has been mandated by the 
ASRM is incorporated in acknowledgement of the very fact that women who are 
vulnerable as a result of financial need should not be accepted as donors (Dickens, 2001; 
Gurmankin, 2001).  Yet, in questioning the content and quality of informed consent 
applied in the processes of egg transfer, Chapter 2 exhibits that the application of 
informed consent in the practices of egg donation are highly complex and have many 
inherent difficulties.   
 The weaknesses of informed consent become even more complicated when the 
financial incentives and motives are factored in.  In discounting the exploitation of 
donors, many practitioners point to the fact that, during the screening process, they try to 
weed out potential donors who are “vulnerable through poverty who have no other means 
of earning” (Dickens, 2001, p. 341).  Yet close examination of the screening process 
shows that it is not flawless.  For instance, Gorrill (1998), whom I quoted in the first 
chapter, contends that donors’ motives are explored to “ensure that donation is not done 
as an act of desperation” (p.45).  This objective of the screening process (and many 
others) interestingly diverts attention away from examining the actual practices of egg 
transfer by psychlogizing the potential donors.  Thus, the screening processes are used as 
a measure of individual potential donors’ ability to tolerate the conditions of egg transfer 
while the broader ethics and acceptability of these procedures remain largely 
unproblematized.   
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 The use of donor screening processes warrant further critique because, even 
though the use of screening to avert financial exploitation (or pressure from family 
members in the case of known donors)5 may reduce many instances of outright 
manipulation, can the degree of a woman’s desperation really be judged by another?  Is 
not the assessment of this experience really subjective?   
 The ability of a psychologist to determine a potential donor’s level of desperation 
is further complicated by a finding of Kalfoglou & Geller’s (2000) research on the 
experiences of egg donors.  Their research indicates that, “Because donors did not have 
the reassurance that information they provided would not be used to exclude them or be 
kept confidential, and because they did not always understand the purpose for some of 
the questions, there was information that donors felt they had to conceal from the 
psychologists” (p.228).  Thus, in feeling compelled to disguise the extent of their need for 
the donor fee, potential donors may conceal the very “desperation” that ART 
practitioners might otherwise use to exclude them from donating. 
 On a similar note, some practitioners acknowledge that students are also an 
inappropriate population to serve as egg donors because of their characteristically 
precarious financial status.  For example, Gorrill (1998) indicates that, “Some ART 
programs specifically do not target students as egg donor candidates because of the 
concern this group may be particularly vulnerable to the coercive power of money” (p. 
49).  Yet this claim stands in complete contradiction to the majority of donor narratives 
and investigative reports on egg transfer that appear in the popular press (e.g. Watson, 
1997; Mead, 1999; Blacksher, 2000; Healy, 2003) as well as in the attitudes of many 
practitioners.  Rosenthal  (1998), for instance, declares that, “Many of our most prized 
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donors are college or graduate students in their early 20s, whose value as donors is based 
on their intelligence and the youthful age of their eggs” (p.190).  Practitioners’ claims 
that they try to protect vulnerable potential donors are hard to take seriously when 
sentiments such as Rosenthal’s are stated out-right and also appear more subtly in 
descriptions of the ideal donor, or solicitation efforts aimed directly at student 
populations.   
 By focusing concerns about exploiting donors on the psychological status of 
individual donors rather than the contexts of egg transfer and ARTs, just one more 
parallel to historical attempts to pin reproductive “problems” on women is established.  
Yet even if one does take the screening processes seriously as a means for protecting 
donors form exploitation, numerous contradictions become apparent in attempts to 
identify and exclude particularly vulnerable potential donors.  These various 
inconsistencies seem to suggest that the prospect of exploiting donors is an issue that 
receives only token attention or concern from those who are best positioned to eliminate 
it – i.e. practitioners and egg recipients. 
Contesting Claims of the Harmlessness of Commodifying Eggs  
 This chapter has been devoted to breaking down the various justifications offered 
for the financial compensation that is uniquely paid to egg donors in the United States.  
Based on the impossibility of determining eggs’ value, the shortcomings of informed 
consent, and superficial attempts to prevent particularly vulnerable populations of women 
from donating – all of which were demonstrated in this chapter – the bodies of donors are 
apparently being both commodified and exploited by most instances of egg transfer in the 
U.S. 
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Obviously, these assertions may not apply to all donors.  Yet while appropriate 
precautions are theoretically taken to avoid disempowerment and taking advantage of 
donors, the potent ial for exploitation in practice is much higher than our society is led to 
believe by common representations of egg transfer.  The moral and ethical repugnance of 
such prospects make sense of Americans’ insistence on clinging so tightly to the belief 
that donors are not being paid for their eggs. 
If one steps back for a moment though, a rather overt, yet unacknowledged 
message lies right at the surface of the ways in which financial compensation to donors is 
explained.  The fact that (despite the bodily costs they incur) donors are paid for other 
things as opposed to their eggs indicates that women’s bodies – particularly women’s 
reproductive bodies – are not valued by our society.  While the debates over donor fees 
get entangled in efforts to protect donors from exploitation and coercion, U.S. society 
totally loses sight of the fact that the subject of these debates affects women’s 
experiences of their bodies, and that the practices of egg transfer have serious 
consequences for women’s bodies. 
Of course, if one acknowledges that the conclusions drawn from the payment 
debates are not even seriously applied to the situations of egg donors, an even stronger 
statement is made about the worth our society attributes to women.  As I suggest in the 
previous section of this chapter, the protection of vulnerable potential donors receives 
only token attention.  Becker (2000) provides evidence of this in saying that even though 
many people utilizing donated eggs recognize and “express concern about” the potential 
for the “disenfranchisement and exploitation” of donors, “in all cases, they went ahead 
with their plans” (p.153).  This callous disregard of the plight faced by donors clearly 
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asserts that women’s reproductive bodies are actually valued, but that the women who 
are donating their reproductive cells are not.  The fragmentation of women’s bodies that 
has occurred as a result of attempting to establish justifiable compensatory practices 
within uses of egg transfer has thus produced a new version of the objectification of 
women’s bodies and the presumption that the primary function of women’s bodies is still 
reproduction.   
 
                                                 
1 This seemingly arbitrary distinction seems to parallel the fine line drawn between other practices in which 
women profit from the use of their bodies.  For instance, prostitution has been criminalized in the U.S. for 
commodifying women’s embodied sexuality whereas erotic dancing is a legal form of “entertainment.” 
2 Clearly, the majority of my discussion has seemingly excluded women who receive no monetary 
compensation for their participation in egg transfer – one example of which would be known donors.  Yet 
in actuality, many women who donate to family and friends with no expectations of compensation can 
justifiably be clu mped together with women who receive monetary compensation due to the fact that they 
may receive material or non-material rewards (e.g. increased status or respect within the family, receipt of 
favors, etc.) which may easily simulate the exchange that occurs through financial compensation of 
anonymous donors. 
3 In suggesting that the commodification of donors’ bodies is automatically assumed by the 
commodification of their eggs, I am treading on some treacherous ground.  This extension fails to consider 
the idea that once eggs are removed from a woman’s body, they are no longer part of her body.  Is there a 
point when a donor’s eggs are no longer considered pieces of her body?  When they have been retrieved?  
Or implanted in another woman’s body?  When it becomes a gestating fetus inside another woman’s body?   
If the fact that the eggs are produced from a woman’s body indicates that they will always be a part of her 
body, whether they remain inside her body or not, is a child produced from a woman’s egg thus also 
eternally part of her body?  Would the answer to these questions differ in the case of sperm donors? 
4 Initially, some concern was voiced over the possibility that by donating their eggs, donors may reduce the 
number of eggs they have themselves, should they desire a child at a later time.  This fear was quelled by 
researchers’ reassurance that this would not be the base because several oocytes go to waste each menstrual 
cycle, as numerous follicles are released, but only one matures.  It will be interesting to see if this fear is 
further alleviated by newly breaking research (based on lab mice) suggesting that women may in fact 
produce eggs across the lifespan, rather than have a set number of eggs at birth (see Angier, 2004 for a 
description of these findings). 
5 As Raymond (1991) argues, “The potential for women’s exploitation is not necessarily less, merely 
because no money is involved and the arrangements may take place within a family setting.  The family has 
hardly been a safe place for women” (p.64).  Based on the alarming prevalence of emotional, physical, and 
sexual abuse that women and girls encounter within family contexts, Raymond’s assertions are well 
grounded in claiming that the family may also be a source of women’s exploitation. 
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Chapter 4:  
Re-conceiving Reproductive Freedom 
 
 At the time Mead’s 1999 story on egg donation was printed in the New Yorker, 
Cindy Schiller, the central character and supposed paradigmatic egg donor, was an 
intelligent, attractive, light-skinned, blue-eyed, graduate student who had donated her 
eggs while both an undergraduate and graduate student.  Among Schiller’s many 
accomplishments and activities of note that are woven throughout the story of her 
involvement with this ART is mention of her central role in an organization called 
“Students for Reproductive Freedom.”  Schiller’s involvement with this particular 
organization probably ignited little interest from the average reader, as this affiliation is 
listed among several of her other activist interests.  Yet in light of my own consideration 
of the implications of egg donation for women’s reproductive freedom, I could not help 
but contemplate the implication of Schiller’s association with this organization.  
 In considering Schiller’s identification as a reproductive rights activist, I 
entertained questions such as, if (as Chapter 3 shows), the processes of egg transfer do 
commodify donors’ eggs and bodies, are such uses of one’s reproductive capabilities 
contradictory to notions of reproductive freedom?  If so, is there a discrepancy here 
between Schiller’s willingness to commodify her reproductive capabilities, while 
simultaneously working to promote and protect women’s reproductive freedoms?  In 
other words, does Schiller’s donation of her eggs damage or contradict the very 
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reproductive rights she is committed to supporting?  Less consequentially, is this yet one 
more example of the contradictory situations conjured by the practices of egg donation?  
Or, is it indicative of a more significant shift in the very ways in which we conceive of 
notions of reproductive freedom? 
 In reflecting on the discourses around egg donation that have enabled the 
production of representations such as those examined in earlier chapters, Schiller’s 
situation seems to indicate that notions of women’s reproductive freedom are in fact 
transforming through our current uses of ARTs such as egg transfer.  The ability to 
describe concisely a complex notion such as reproductive freedom is rare.  However the 
central characteristic of contemporary discourses of women’s reproductive freedom can 
actually be summarized in a single word: stewardship.   
As a whole, the representations of egg transfer that I have drawn on in previous 
chapters demonstrate the ways in which our operative definitions of reproductive 
freedom have shifted away from previous notions of reproductive freedom that 
emphasized women’s power to define their own roles as sexual and/or reproductive 
women in our society.  Instead, current perspectives of reproductive freedom now seem 
to be focusing women’s ability to “steward” their reproductive capabilities. 
 Admittedly, this is a very subtle discursive shift, but by elucidating the dynamics 
and ideologies of our present discourses, I will argue that this shift has significant 
impacts on the objectives of contemporary women’s movements.  In order to build this 
argument clearly, I will need to identify current commonly held perspectives of 
reproductive freedoms, as well as the ir significance for women today.  To do so, the first 
part of this chapter will explain how discourses of stewardship function to establish 
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women’s reproductive freedom – specifically by drawing on the appearance of these 
discourses in current representations of egg transfer that were analyzed in Chapter 1.  The 
second part of this chapter will pry at the gaps and incongruities within these discourses 
to show that equations of stewardship with women’s reproductive freedom may, in fact, 
not be adding up properly. 
Egg Stewardship: Proper management of reproductive resources 
 The characterization of discourses about egg transfer as based in stewardship is 
not one I have pulled out of thin air.  Several critics, scholars, and practitioners have both 
explicitly and implicitly implemented ideologies of stewardship to the practices of egg 
transfer (e.g. Shanley, 2001; Blacksher, 2000; Mead, 1999; Healy, 2003; ASRM, 2000), 
and ARTs more broadly (Sawicki, 1999; Becker, 2000; Dill, 2001).   
 As a general concept, stewardship invokes notions of responsible or careful 
management, or administration of valuable resources.  In applying this idea specifically 
to women’s reproductive freedom, one must consider what is the object that requires 
stewardship, or what is being managed by whom, and why?  The predominant 
representations of egg transfer analyzed in Chapter 1 offer some insight into how these 
questions might be answered.  Specifically, through the implementation of ideas of 
donors’ altruism and freedom from exploitation, common representations of egg transfer 
demonstrate how stewardship discourses are now equated with women’s reproductive 
freedom.  To elucidate how these discourses have become viable metonyms for women’s 
reproductive freedom, I will examine how typical components of egg transfer 
representations make such connections possible. 
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 How women have become egg stewards 
 In contemporary discourses around egg transfer the portrayal of donors’ 
reproductive freedom as stewardship both initiates from, and perpetuates ideas of their 
eggs as the valuable resources that require careful management.1  A few of the 
individuals who critique this ART actually directly use the perception of eggs as 
resources to establish the relevance of stewardship to our contemporary narratives of 
reproduction.  For example, in her discussion of egg and sperm donation, Shanley (2001) 
declares, 
A person’s relationship to his or her genetic material is better thought of as a kind 
of stewardship than as ownership.  Thinking about what is involved in gamete 
transfer should turn us away from those strands of the liberal tradition that 
emphasize the individual and property in the body, and toward those strands that 
rest on a deeper understanding of the person rooted in multiple and complex 
relationships to family and civil society (Shanley, 2001, p.95). 
 
In this passage, Shanley raises some points that are important for construing donors’ eggs 
as resources and in need of administration, which thus supports notions of stewardship.   
 First, Shanley determines that people’s genetic material – specifically their eggs 
and sperm – is not a commodity that can be sold or bartered.  This aspect of stewardship 
discourses is apparent in the various representations of egg transfer discussed in earlier 
chapters which attempt to forward only depictions in which eggs are not commodified 
and donors are free from exploitation.  In fact, the idea that women are merely managers 
of their eggs coordinates perfectly with the assertion critiqued in Chapter 3 that donor 
fees are compensation for time and inconvenience rather than women’s eggs.  If the eggs 
being provided for ART procedures are managed by women, rather than being seen as 
parts of their bodies, it becomes nearly impossible to conceive of donors being exploited 
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by the eggs’ use – especially when the donors are being handsomely rewarded for their 
time administering these eggs.   
 Additionally, by implanting the ideas that women’s relationships to their eggs are 
much greater than mere ownership within the contexts of social responsibilities, Shanley 
elevated the status of ova to a position of resource that bears significance to society, not 
just individual women.  As such, the humanitarian goodness that is portrayed as a 
hallmark of egg donors fits seamlessly into the story line of women as stewards of their 
eggs.  The emphasized representations of donors’ altruism, which were identified in the 
first chapter and deposed in the second, provide the ideal fuel for the idea that women are 
acting merely as stewards of reproductive resources and capabilities – and ultimately 
their bodies – for the good of all members of society. 
Blacksher (2000) provides some additional perspective on the idea of gametes, 
and eggs in particular, as resources requiring stewardship.  In the process of debating the 
idea of donating her eggs, Blacksher echoes the above passage from Shanley, as she 
comes to the conclusion that she does not own her eggs as one owns a material 
commodity.  Instead, she describes, “The biologic potential of this human material to 
throw into being another singular human, an entity that would transcend its material 
origins, began to give me pause.  Complex and unique individuals were born out of this 
highly improbable, chance event, and this suggested to me that these precursors to life 
deserved my thoughtful stewardship” (p.29).   
As Blacksher suggests, women’s eggs as societally significant resources draw 
their value – or rather, the fact that they are invaluable – from the potential they have to 
produce human life.  By stating eggs’ relevance to the formation of human life, Blacksher 
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invokes their significance as links to both the past and the future of the human 
continuum.  As such, they have priceless potential outcomes, and thus clearly need 
someone to ensure their proper use.  Also, by qualifying the necessary stewardship of 
women’s eggs as “thoughtful,” Blacksher shows how women have been granted the 
privilege of deciding the fate of these precious resources, accompanied by the knowledge 
and responsibility that whatever choices they make will carry great consequence for both 
themselves and all of humankind.   
 Managing resources through “choice” 
While this discussion of eggs as resources that are managed by women certainly 
supports the application of the term “stewardship” to donors’ role in egg transfer, at this 
point, one might be wondering how this relates to women’s reproductive freedom.  
Drawing on the above excerpt from Blacksher, her implication (even though she does not 
specifically articulate it) is that women have a choice of how to administer their eggs.  In 
fact, framing practices of egg donation with the concept of stewardship assumes that 
women have free reign over their eggs and may manage them in any way they see fit.   
As egg stewards, women are purportedly recognized as the sole executors of these 
eggs, which potentially could be a very empowering situation for women.  How the eggs 
in women’s ovaries are administered is thus seemingly their choice, which rests the fate 
of humanity in women’s hands, or more literally, their ovaries.  As Chapter 2 indicates, 
this presumed decision-making power of donors is read though the cultural lenses of 
“choice” that are shaped and informed by feminist histories of women battling for the 
freedom of both their bodies and destinies through control of their own reproductive 
lives.  Thus, the supposed presence of donors’ autonomous choice in managing eggs 
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becomes conflated with the similar, but more politically invested concept of “choice” as 
is understood in terms of reproductive freedom. 
This connection between women’s administration of their eggs and reproductive 
freedom is affirmed further by Shanley’s insinuation (which grounded women’s 
relationship to their eggs within societal obligation) that women’s stewardship or 
donation of their eggs is based in altruism and freedom from exploitation – which the 
previous chapters determined are both concepts that are hinged upon the assumption or 
supposed precondition of donors’ autonomous choice to participate in egg transfer.  Thus, 
by embedding the discourses of stewardship within constructions of altruism, societal 
obligations, freedom from exploitation, and ultimately within notions of “choice,” 
stewardship has metonymically come to index contemporary conceptions of women’s 
reproductive freedom.   
In stepping back to examine how notions of stewardship, altruism, and the 
absence of exploitation cooperate to influence our current perceptions of egg transfer, and 
women’s reproductive freedom more broadly, the presumed presence of donors’ free 
choice to participate in this ART serves as a central pillar in assembling favorable 
perspectives of egg donation.  Yet as Chapters 2 and 3 exhibit, women’s ability to 
autonomously choose to donate their eggs is weakly constructed.   
In metaphorical terms, it is almost as if our current representations and awareness 
of egg transfer exist as a house of mirrors in which donors’ altruism, the absence of 
exploitation, and “choice,” repetitively reflect off one another in such ways so as to 
construct an image which equates donor stewardship with their reproductive freedom.  As 
a result, women’s rights and responsibilities to manage their eggs are seen as a perfect 
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picture of women’s bodily rights.  Yet if one of these mirrors was to break, or if one of 
these central images was disrupted, the reflections of all the other images would be 
distorted.  In other words, because the ideas of “choice,” donor altruism, and freedom 
from exploitation are so intricately reliant upon one another, the disruption of one image 
alters all other reflected images in this house of mirrors, including that of donors’ 
stewardship as reproductive freedom.  Thus, in light of the incongruities raised around 
autonomous donor choice in previous chapters, I will now unearth some of the gaps in 
stewardship discourses that are typically glossed over in contemporary representations of 
egg transfer. 
Shattering Images of “Choice” and Disrupting Stewardship Discourses  
The questionable status of donors’ autonomous choice that is brought forth in 
both Chapters 2 and 3 suggests that the presumption of donors’ reproductive freedom 
may be more problematic than is implied by the stewardship discourses.  For instance, the 
gaps within the processes of informed consent, manipulation of women’s feelings of 
empowerment through the appropriation of feminist ideologies, and utilization of 
gendered kin relationships, which may all factor into women’s decisions to donate their 
eggs, endanger their ability to make the autonomous choice to participate (see Chapter 2).  
Additionally, the indeterminate impact of monetary compensation and the inability of 
ART practitioners to weed out all financially vulnerable potential donors, further 
jeopardize donors’ reproductive freedoms (see Chapter 3). 
In sum, when considered together, the questions raised in Chapters 2 and 3 about 
altruism, autonomy, and exploitation, ultimately contest whether a decision to donate 
one’s eggs on the bases of altruism and autonomy can truly exist—specifically within 
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contexts of financial gain (regardless of the intended object of payment) and the cultural 
pressures that burden women with a sense of duty to reproduce and/or nurture others.  
Thus, as persuasively configured are the discourses of women as stewards of their 
reproductive capabilities, the arguments built in Chapters 2 and 3 challenge the validity 
of such discourses. 
Stewardship as a false vision of reproductive freedom 
Even if one takes for granted the existence of free choice for egg donors (as is the 
case in representations of egg transfer), this ART still poses several problems in equating 
stewardship of reproductive capabilities with reproductive freedom.  On the surface, the 
stewardship discourses may be read as affirming of women’s rights because if anyone is 
going to be a steward of women’s reproductive capabilities, including her eggs, it is 
desirable for each woman to maintain this responsibility herself.  Although the agency 
implied in this reading may be experienced as empowering by some women, it ultimately 
devalues all women’s worth by using very limited aspects of individual women as the 
scale by which all women are measured.   
Furthermore, by fragmenting women’s bodies both literally and ideologically, 
ideas of egg donation as stewardship encourage women to (yet again) see parts of their 
bodies as “resources” that require management.2  The stewardship discourses position 
women’s eggs as “natural” resources – as was indicated by the biological and genetic 
emphases of the excerpts from Shanley and Blacksher earlier in this chapter – that have 
invaluable potential outcomes.3  In this sense, the proper management of women’s eggs is 
as much a public concern as is, say, preventing deforestation of wilderness areas, or 
maintaining healthy citizens in order to form a standing army.  In following this line of 
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thinking, if a woman fails to properly utilize the eggs she is stewarding (i.e. through 
donation or pregnancy), is she harming or short-changing society, or the nation, by 
allowing such valuable resources to go to waste?   
The obligations embedded in this question show that even as notions of 
stewardship provide women with the privilege of determining the fate of the eggs in their 
ovaries, women simultaneously are granted the hefty responsibility of determining the 
future of human existence.  Thus, women have been thrust into roles as stewards, or 
nurturing managers of the past, present, and future of U.S. society, and ultimately the 
human race.  Consequently, the high stakes of egg stewardship appear to have spawned 
yet one more permutation of the seemingly eternal imperative for women to be active in 
procreation in order to qualify as “true” women, i.e. biological and cultural reproducers 
of society.   
The pressure that women experience to embody “true womanhood” provides a 
salient example of “biopower”4 as theorized by Foucault (1978), because in forwarding 
such traditional gender ideology, the stewardship discourses have crafted women’s 
proper management of their eggs into more of an imperative than a choice.  In other 
words, the constructions of women as egg stewards presents a disciplining and restricting 
force on women’s “choice,” rather than an endowment of rights and freedom.  As such, 
the stewardship discourses are enacting social and psychological control over women 
which compels them to be complicit with narrowly defined roles as reproducing 
machines (Foucault, 1977; Bartky, 1998). Through embracing the notions of their 
obligation and social responsibility to steward their reproductive capabilities women are 
both abiding by, and helping to construct a framework, built upon stewardship, that limits 
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the very realm of what women and society are even able to recognize as the options from 
which women are able to choose (subRosa, 2002). 
Such gendered ideology is carried over into the belief that women’s sense of 
stewardship over their eggs will compel them to monitor and maximize the use of their 
eggs – not with the objective of protecting their own interests, but with that of serving the 
believed interests of humanity.  Women’s own interests are superceded by what Shanley 
(2001) describes as their “multiple and complex relationships to family and civil society” 
(p.95).  These gendered expectations of self-sacrifice are deeply embedded in nostalgic 
societal imaginings of motherhood (and by implication, womanhood) that call upon 
assumptions of women’s nature as essentially good, kind, and altruistic. 
However, by positioning women as egg stewards in this way, feminist objectives 
of women’s liberation are negated in at least two ways.  In the first place, the gendered 
expectations embedded in ideas of stewardship provide very restricting constructions of 
what women’s reproductive freedom might look like.  In other words, the stewardship 
discourses offer a limited view of the appropriate intentions and outcomes of women’s 
reproductive behaviors (e.g. constructing heterosexual nuclear families, reifying 
traditional gender roles, etc.) and therefore perpetuate restrictive categories and roles of 
womanhood from which many feminists believe women need to be liberated.  
A second way in which feminist visions of reproductive freedom are negated by 
these discourses exists in the very fact that ideas of stewardship place anyone else’s need 
over those of individual women.  By prioritizing the interests of women’s families, 
communities, and society – as well as members of past and future generations – over the 
well-being and bodily integrity of the very women who are accepting (arguably 
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unnecessary risks) by agreeing to participate in egg transfer, the stewardship discourses 
undeniably deviate from the mission of women’s liberation and empowerment sought by 
feminist movements.5 
Of course, my contention that women’s interest should be attended to first reveals 
a fundamental conflict between the objectives of women’s liberation and definitions of 
stewardship (i.e. stewards should act primarily for the good of the whole – i.e. women’s 
communities or society).  This is not to say that the goal of women’s reproductive 
freedom is to completely individualize their reproductive choices.  To clarify my point 
here, I am not arguing that earlier feminist visions of reproductive freedom attempted to 
remove women’s reproductive lives from the social contexts in which they made 
decisions, acted, and/or were acted upon.  Rather, it seems that the stewardship 
discourses enable the de-contextualization and disembodiment of donors by conveniently 
remaining oblivious to the gendered, racist, and classist conditions influencing donors’ 
experiences.   
Historically and contemporarily, considering women’s reproductive freedom as 
embedded within complex sociological frameworks is both appropriate and necessary in 
all attempts to establish and protect women’s reproductive freedoms (Roberts, 1997; 
Corea, Hanmer, Klein, Raymond, & Rowland, 1987).  But problems arise when the social 
connections and obligations are forwarded as the raison d’etre of women’s reproductive 
freedom (as in the case of egg transfer).  In other words, stewardship discourses 
foreground and attribute greater importance to the interests of society, at the cost of 
donors’ embodied experiences receiving adequate acknowledgement.  Much of this 
problem stems from the fact that the resources women are charged with stewarding are 
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actually part of the women’s bodies.  Perhaps this suggests then, that stewardship is not 
an appropriate framework for thinking about women’s use of their eggs, or any aspect of 
their reproductive lives for that matter.   
However, as a consequence of these imbalanced priorities of society’s interest 
over women’s needs, individual women’s rights to act in ways that first and foremost 
benefit themselves, rather than other individuals, or even humanity as a whole are denied.  
While these assertions may sound purely selfish, assuming that an individual is capable 
of making any decision completely separate from their social contexts is impossible 
(Petchesky, 1995; Shanley, 2001).  Yet in getting caught up in the ideas that women – as 
the supposed innately self-sacrificial beings – are obligated to manage their reproductive 
abilities to specific ends (primarily in the interest of their family, society, race, or 
species), the objective of ever establishing women’s reproductive freedom gets lost by 
minimizing the consideration of individual and collective women’s personal concerns.  
Thus, in shaping individual women’s decisions with societal interests, stewardship 
discourses transform and shift the individual politics of reproductive practices for women 
as a collective. 
 Judging from the various chasms in the continuity of stewardship discourses that I 
have identified here, maintaining the presumption that women’s reproductive freedom is 
universally promoted by egg transfer – and ARTS more generally – is impossible.  To 
return to the metaphor of the house of mirrors, my arguments have exposed the fragility 
of the representations of donor altruism, freedom from exploitation, and “choice.”  In 
doing so, I have exposed the vulnerability of the perception that egg stewardship is 
representative of reproductive freedom.  Thus, if the equation of egg donors’ reproductive 
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freedom with stewardship of their eggs remains dependent upon a myopic concentration 
on donors’ altruism and the premise that donors are not being exploited, a false vision of 
reproductive freedom will continue to be fostered and perpetuated. 
                                                 
1 The reason for my use of the terminology of “resources” in reference to women’s eggs in this chapter is a 
reflection of the ideologies forwarded by the discourses being examined.  The identification of women’s 
eggs as “resources” in this chapter is not necessarily contrary to the arguments made in Chapter 3 that 
women’s eggs have become commodities.  However, the shift in terminology is accompanied by some 
different connotations.     
2 This argument, that females can utilize their bodies as various types of resources for advancement, is not 
limited to the realm of reproduction.  In fact, the idea that women can use their supposed bodily assets (e.g. 
attractive appearance, sexuality, physical weakness, etc.) – which are embedded in sexism and traditional 
ideas of gender – to obtain gains (e.g. avoiding speeding tickets, getting into clubs, acquiring employment, 
etc.), is one that I often hear voiced by students in my “Introduction to Women’s Studies” class.   
3 My purpose in placing the term natural in quotation marks in this passage is two-fold.  First, I am playing 
off our typical conception of what is meant when the phrase “natural resources” is used (e.g. petroleum 
reserves, clean water, etc.).  More importantly, my second intent is to point to the fact that while ova 
generally form within most women’s bodies without intervention of any kind, the practices of extracting 
them en masse from women’s bodies clearly cannot be categorized as natural processes. 
4 Haraway (1997) offers a useful explanation of this term.  She states, “I understand Foucault’s (1978) 
concept of biopower to refer to the practices of administration, therapeutics, and surveillance of bodies that 
discursively constitute, increase, and manage the forces of l iving organisms” (p.11).   
5 These arguments are also frequently used to combat the increasingly prominent conservative and anti-
choice efforts to establish “fetal rights.”  Over the past ten to fifteen years, opponents of abortion have 
fought for, and gained much ground in creating policy and legislation that recognizes the rights of unborn 
fetuses as independent from the rights of the women carrying the fetus.  “Fetal rights” advocates hope that 
in obtaining these rights for fetuses, they will be able to revoke women’s freedom of reproductive choice 
that was established by the landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court case.  Such efforts have been 
reflected in the prosecution of pregnant women drug-users for such “crimes” as fetal abuse (see Hartouni, 
1997).  The battle for fetus’ rights is also apparent in the current Congressional debate over the Unborn 
victims of Violence Law (also know as “Laci and Connor’s Law,” so-called in remembrance of the brutally 
murdered Laci Peterson in 2002, during her eighth mo nth of pregnancy).  Women’s rights advocates 
coming from a wide variety of theoretical and political perspectives contest the arguments for “fetal rights” 
on the basis that they are clearly misogynistic in undermining the rights of mature, living women in the 
interests of unborn fetuses (National Organization for Women, 2004). 
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Epilogue: 
The Current Status of Reproductive Freedom 
 
 If the current situation of egg transfer is taken as a model, as I suggested in the 
last chapter, what can be concluded about the present status of women’s reproductive 
freedom?  In looking at the case of egg donors, even though they have the apparent 
ability to choose whether they will participate in egg transfer, their reproductive freedom 
is evidently undermined by the mythical proportions of both donors’ perceived altruism 
and the humanitarian concerns women are believed to be demonstrating by donating their 
eggs.   
 In illuminating the contextual conditionality of women’s reproductive choices, the 
situation of egg donors speaks more broadly to the ways in which all of women’s 
reproductive decisions are deeply embedded within a complicated network of personal 
and societal factors.  Corea, et al (1987) explain the political significance of women’s 
personal reproductive decisions in stating,   
Claims for a ‘right to choose’ cannot take place outside of the general revolutionary 
movement for women’s freedom.  And we cannot use individualistic solutions to 
deal with social problems.  ‘Choice’ is only meaningful when material and social 
conditions are such that we may truly exercise it in equity and without threatening 
the survival or the rights of all women (p.8-9). 
 
Thus, according to Corea and her colleagues, in supposedly altruistically choosing to 
donate their eggs, women are exhibiting their personal needs and desires as well as the 
societal and cultural influences that shape such individual motives.   
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 Although recognition of this simultaneous expression of personal and societal 
impulses to donate may seem like an obvious observation, this point actually identifies 
the underlying danger that current U.S. uses of egg transfer bear in terms of women’s 
reproductive freedom.  As I have demonstrated throughout this examination of egg 
transfer, the material and social conditions (e.g. financial need, familial expectations , pro-
natalist pressure, etc.) tha t women as potential egg donors face are largely ignored in 
favor of the nearly hypnotizing notions of altruism.  Through this erasure of the contexts 
around egg donation, many people have come to see egg transfer and other ARTs as 
promoting women’s reproductive freedom by expanding their reproductive options (e.g. 
by allegedly increasing the reproductive lifespan of countless women). 
 However, by unearthing egg donors’ often disregarded bodily experiences from 
the obsessive attention devoted to the oppositionally framed motives of altruism and 
financial gain, I have revealed egg transfer to be a form of “stratified reproduction.”1  
Application of this term to the dynamics of egg transfer seems strikingly appropriate as 
there is clearly a class division between who is able to benefit from its practice and who 
must sacrifice for its success.2  Yet this division is conveniently hidden from view by the 
domineering presence of the stewardship discourses based on the allegation of all 
women’s “choice.”  The extent to which stewardship discourses and ideas of “choice” 
gloss over the hierarchical division and injustice of egg transfer is evident when one or all 
of the images in the house of mirrors is shattered.  Through the disruption of such 
representations and discourses, some of the impacts of stratified reproduction on broader 
notions of reproductive freedom may be acknowledged and addressed. 
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 However employing this term “stratified reproduction” to egg donation is not to 
say that the women at the bottom of this particular stratified system (i.e. egg donors) are 
the only ones negatively impacted by such practices.  As Corea’s quotation above 
suggests, by impinging on the ability of any woman to make autonomous reproductive 
choice, the freedom of all women is endangered.  This point is evidenced by both the 
implications and prevalence of stewardship discourses.  In reinforcing gendered cultural 
ideologies in which altruism is an expected aspect of women’s nature, stewardship 
discourses contribute to restrictive definitions of all women’s reproductive roles. 
 These same notions of stewardship have clearly been applied much more broadly 
than just to the experiences of egg donors.  For example, in acknowledging the various 
regimens, schedules, and treatments that infertile women are expected to undergo in their 
battles against infertility, the perceived necessity of these women managing (or 
stewarding) their reproductive capabilities becomes undisputable (see Becker, 2000; 
subRosa, 2002).  As a more disturbing case in point, the impacts of stewardship are seen 
through the hyper-vigilance exercised over pregnant women that recently justified the 
arrest of a woman in Utah for refusing a caesarean section – a decision which purportedly 
could have prevented the “death” of one of the twin fetuses she was carrying. 3  Such 
cases, which are not infrequent, reinforce the idea that women’s reproductive practices 
are purely in the service of others. 
 As this last example demonstrates, the seemingly innocuous (and perhaps even 
admirable) repercussions of perceiving women’s reproductive choice in terms of 
stewardship enable an overt assault on the ideological concept of reproductive freedom 
and its bodily consequences.  This onslaught is relevant to all women, regardless of their 
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place in reproductive hierarchies.  As the current Bush administration’s fondness for 
infringing upon women’s reproductive rights serves as a guide for policy and legislation, 4 
the increasingly conservative climate being witnessed in the contemporary U.S. is 
exhibiting escalating hostility toward women’s rights and the protection of their bodily 
integrity.  Thus, if we as a society continue to tolerate, rationalize, or excuse portrayals of 
women’s reproductive abilities and “resources” as both separate from their bodies and 
persons, as well as selflessly provided for the greater good – as has been done in the case 
of egg transfer – we will in essence be facilitating even further erosion of all women’s 
reproductive freedom.  
                                                 
1 Ginsburg & Rapp (1995) briefly explain the idea of “stratified reproduction” in describing it as “the 
power relations by which some categories of people are empowered to nurture and reproduce, while others 
are disempowered” (p.3).  Shellee Colen (1995), who originally coined this phrase, provides an expanded 
definition in saying, “By stratified reproduction  I mean that physical and social reproductive tasks are 
accomplished differentially according to inequalities that are based on hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, 
gender, place in a global economy, and migration status and that are structured by social, economic, and 
political forces.  .  .  .  Stratified reproduction, particularly with the increasing commodification of 
reproductive labor, itself reproduces stratification by reflecting, reinforcing, and intensifying the 
inequalities on which it is based” (p.78). 
2 A prime example of the inequalities inherent in the stratified reproductive practices of egg transfer is 
brought forth through an identical situation with surrogacy, identified by Raymond (1993).  She asks, “If 
women were truly lining up to become surrogate mothers out of altruism and concern for the infertile, we 
would have middle -and upper-class women bearing the babies of lower-class couples, where the added gift 
of aiding those who cannot afford to pay would be an even greater expression of altruism.  Presumably, 
altruism is a cross-class phenomenon, but it does not appear to work that way in surrogacy situations” 
(p.45).  All indications suggest that the same inequalities are exhibited in practices of egg donation. 
3 See Ellen Goodman’s (2004) editorial for a more extensive discussion of this case and previous related 
cases. 
4 For instance, the Bush administration’s most widely known attacks on women’s reproductive freedom 
include staunch support of “abstinence only” sex education in public schools, the imposition of the “global 
gag rule” which denies funding to international organization that counsel women on abortion, passage of 
legislation that bans late-term abortions even when medically necessary, and making life -time 
appointments of firmly anti-choice judges to federal courts without Congressional approval.  And the list 
goes on .  .  .   
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